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WAR LABOR BOARD

THE AUTHORITY OF THE NATIONAL WAR LABOR
:SOARD OVER LABOR DISPUTES

Leonard B. Boudin*

T

HE National War Labor Board has reached the respectable age of
two years. Supported originally only by the President's ~ar powers, it has secured compliance with its orders, has weathered a minor
congressional investigation, and has built up a body of de_s:isions whose
effect will continue after the war. These facts, as well as certain signs
of the .conservatism 1 which appears to strike all govermp.ent agencies
at one time or another, entitle the board to a short survey of certain
aspects of its jurisdiction and authority.
·
The board's power is deriv~d from a series of ex€cutive orders and
statutes which start with Executive Order 9017 of January r2, 194-2.2
This ordey was a result of a joint conference between labor ~n.d management representatives on December 17, 1941, following! the outbreak of war. The conference reached three basic conclusions: 8

"1.

There shall be no strikes or lockouts

"2. All disputes shall be settled by peaceful means.
"3. The President shall set up a proper War Labor Board to
handle these disputes."
The President in a letter sent to the conferees stated that he accepted their covenants "that there shall be no strikes or lockouts and
all disputes shall be settled by peaceful means." 4 He concluded that
"the three points agreed upon cover of necessity all disputes'that may
arise between labor and management." -5 •
Executive Order 9017 which created the War Labor Board recites
the existence of a state of war and asserts that "the national interest
demands that there shall be no interruption of any work which contributes to the effective prosecution of the· war." The limitations upon

* Member of the New York and Federal Bars; author of "The Rights M Stri~ers,"
3 5 ILL. L. REv. 8 I 7 ( I 941), and contributor to other legal periodicals.
1
See e.g., transcript of hearings on board changes in jurisdictional policy, California Packing Co., Simon J. Murphy Co., CoNFERENCE OF NATIONAL WAR LABoR'
BoARD WITH REPRESENTATIVES OF AFL AND CIO (unpublished). These cases are cited
infra at notes 76, 88, 98.
2 7 FED. REG. 237 (Jan. 1942); I War Lab. Rep. xvii.
8 1 War Lab. Rep. xiv.
4
lbid.
5
lbid.
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the board's authority appear to be few: that the parties in dispute must
exhaust all other remedies such as negotiation and conciliation; and
that the board should not supersede or act in conflict with other agencies
discussed below. The board was not given authority at this time over
voluntary wage applications.6
.Complete authority over voluntary wage applications, as well as
over disputes of any nature whatsoever, was given to the board by
Executive Order 9250. 1 This order was issued by the President under
the' authority of the Wage Stabilization Law of October 2, ·1942.8
The law prohibits increases or decreases in wages or salaries without
the approval of the board. The executive order which followed created an Office of Economic Stabilization whose director was, with the
President's approval, to "formulate and develop a comprehensive national economic policy." It set forth a basic wage and salary stabilization policy under the immediate control of the War Labor Board.
Most significant, it stated that "the functions of said Board are hereby
extended to cover all industries and all employees."
On April 8, 1943, the President issued Executive Order 9328.9
transferring his powers under Executive Order 9250 to the Office of
Economic Stabilization and further limiting the power of the War
Labor Board to grant wage increases. These restrictions were somewhat lessened by the issuance of the famous May 12th policy directive
of the Director of Economic Stabilization.10
Finally, Congress in June of 1943 passed the Smith-Connally
Law,11 also known as the War Labor Disputes Act. This law grants the
board certain "powers and duties" in addition to those previously held
by it.12 It also provides that whenever the United States Conciliation
Service "certifies that a labor dispute exists which may lead to sub6
Its one attempt to assert such jurisdiction was met with bitter opposition by the
representatives of labor, We"stinghouse Electric & Mfg. ~o., NWLB No. 13, 2 War
Lab. Rep. 281 (1942). Cf. this assumption of jurisdiction over the terms of an
agreement with the board's refusal in another case to reopen the wage provisions upon
the union's appli~ation, Postal Telegraph Cable Co., NWLB No. 86, 1, War Lab.
Rep. 83 (1942).
1
7 FED. REG. 7871 (Oct. 1942); 4 War Lab. Rep. vm (Oct. 3, 1942).
8
Act of Oct. 2, 1942, Pub. L. 729, 77th Cong., 2d sess., 56 Stat. L. 765, entitled "An Act to amend the Emergency Price Control Act of 1942, to aid in preventing inflation, and for other purposes."
9
8 FED. REG. 4681 (April 1943); 7 War Lab. Rep. VII.
10
8 War Lab. Rep. XIV.
11 Act of June 2'5, 1943, Pub. L. 89, 78th Cong., Ist sess., 57 Stat. L. 163; 9 War
Lab. Rep. vn.
12
Id. at§ 7.
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stantial interference with the war effort and cannot be settled by collec\ive bargaining or conciliation," 13 the board is to hold a hearing upon
the merits of the dispute.
CoNsTITUTIONAL AuTHORITY OF THE BoARD

During the first year and a half of its existence, the C©E.Stitutiona.l
basis of the board's authority was the President's war powers' as Commander-in-Chief of the armed forces of the United States. The President has the duty to preserve the Constitution and to fulfill the federal
guarantee to each state of the republican form of government and
protection against invasion.u Translated into industrial terms, he has
the duty to supply the armed forces with the weapons of war. To that
end, the President entrusted the board with the duty to settle labor
disputes which might interrupt war work.
' The board met challenges to its authority with an assertibn of this,
federal power.15 When its decisions, and those ot its predee,essor, the
National Defense Mediation Board, were disobeyed, the President acting under his constitutional war powers, in a number of instances took
action against the recalcitrant employers or employees.16
On June 25, 1943, the board received legislative supp0rt in the
form of the War Labor Disputes Act. This law, like the .executive,
orders of the President, is grounded upon the war powers of the federal
government. While it appears to have added to the board's prestige,
the statute has added little to its legal authority. As a matter of fact,
18

Id. at§ 7 (a) (1).
U.S. Const., Art. II, § 1, Art. IV, § 4, cited by- the board in Bethlehem Steel
Corp. (Little Steel Cas.), NWLB Nos. 30, 31, 34, .35, 1 War Lab Rep. 3H at 351
(1942).
15
Bethlehem Steel Corp. (Little Steel Cas.), NWLB Nos. 30, 31, 34, 35, I War,
Lab. Rep. 324 (1942).
16
Exec. Order 9108, March 21, 1942, seizing property in' enforcement of,
Toledo Peoria & Western R.R. Co., NWLB No. 48, 1 War Lab. R'ep. 4~ (1942), 3.
id. 518 (1942), 4 id. 276 (1942); Exec. Order 9225, Aug, 19, 194-z, enforcing
S.A. Woods Machine Co., NWLB No. 160, 2 War Lab. Rep. 159 (1942); Exec.
Order 8773, June 9, 1941, 6 FED~ REG. 2777 (April-June 1941), enfo'rcing Nort~
American Aviation, Inc., NDMB No. 36; Exec. Order 8868, Aug. 23, 1.94-i, 6 FED.
REG. 4349 (July-Sept. 1941), enforcing Federal Ship-building Co., NDMB No. 46;
Exec. Order 892'8, Oct. 30, 1941, 6 FED. REG. 5559 (Oct.-Dec. 1941), enforcing
Air 4ssociates Inc., NDMB No. 51. These cases are referred to in Report on the
Work of National Dett.nse MediatiOJl Board (March 19, 1941-Jan. 12, i942), U.S.
Bureau of Labor Statistics, Bul. No. 714 (1942). See also warning of the President in
securing enforcement of the NWLB order in Montgomery Ward & Co. Inc., NWLB
192, 1 War Lab. Rep. 280 (1942), 3 id. 9(} (1942), 4 id. 277 ,(1942), 5 id. 80
(1942).
.
14
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the law purports to limit rather than add to the President's power to
seize war plants whose production is threatened by labor disputes.17
THE BoARn's AuTHORITY IN D1sPUTE CASES

At the time of the creation of the National War Labor Board, there
existed a number of agencies, tribunals and forums for the settlement
of certain types of labor disputes. The most important of these were
the National Labor Relations Board and the National Mediation
Board. The executive order took cognizance of these agencies by providing inter alia that "Nothing herein shall be construed as superseding
or in conflict with the provisions of the Railway Labor Act ... the National Labor Relations Act ... the Fair Labor Standards Act . . . and
the Act to provide conditions for the purchase of supplies, etc. . . . or
the Act _amending the Act of March 3, 1931, relating to the rate of
wages for laborers and mechanics ..." 18
It will thus be seen that the authority of the National Labor Relations Board with respect to unfair labor practices a:ffecting commerce,
and the authority of the National Mediation Board and other agencies
established under the Railway Labor- Act with respect to disputes involving common carriers under the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission, remained outside the scope of the board's
jurisdiction. Subsequently on May 22, 1942, an executive order created
a· National Railway Labor Panel with the duty to appoint emergency
boards in railway disputes.19 The "exclusive and final jurisdiction" of
such boards over wage disputes was made subject to the Director of
Economic Stabilization under a later executive order.20 Whether the
latter transfer of final authority is in violation of the Stabilization Act
of October 2, 1942, has for some time been the subject of dispute. The
railway unions, urging this view, relied upon the provision of the act
~ that the President "may not under the authority of this Act suspend any
other law or part thereof." 21 The Director of Economic Stabilization
relied upon. the act's express authority to the President "to issue a general order stabilizing prices, wages and salaries ....n2 2 The latter view,
in our opinion, was correct notwithstanding congressional assertions to
See "The Smith-Connally Act," 3 LAw. GuILD REv. 46 (1943).
Exec. Order 9017, I War Lab. Rep. XVII at § 7, mentioned ~upra note 2.
19
Exec. Order 9172, 7 FED. REG. 3913 (April-June 1942).
20
Exec. Order 9299, issued Feb. 4, 1943, 8 FED. REG. 1669 (Feb. 1943).
21 S. Hearings on S.J. Res. 91, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 8 and 9, 1943 (Committee on Interstate Commerce).
·
22
56 Stat. L. 765 (1942), enacting clause.
17

18
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the contrary.28 On June 30, r944 the act of October '2 was amended
so as to make conclusive a certification by an emergency board appointed
from the National Railway Labqr Panel in a dispute between employees and carriers "that the changes proposed by said settlement' or
recommended settlement are consistent with such standards ,as may be
in effect, established by or pursuant to law, .for the purpose of controlling inflationary tendencies." 28 a
To the board's jurisdiction over disputes in war plants and railways, '
jurisdiction over· disputes involving states or municipalities and their
employees has been added. In the two well-known cases involving the
cities of Newark and New Yark, the board passed a unanimd'us resolution "that it has no power under Executive Order 9or7 to issue any
directive order or regulation in these disputes governing the conduct
of the state or municipal agencies involved." 24 This deci,sion of the
board is based upon the doctrine that "state governments· and their
subdivisions within the sphere of their own jurisdiction are sovereign.
• This sovereignty cannot be interfered with or encroached upon by the
United States Government." 25
Although the board refused to follow the panel's recommendation
that it assume jurisdiction, it issued a clear warning to the municipalities
involved that they did not enjoy complete immunity from federal
power. Dean Morse, writing the board's opinion, stated that "local
governments in time of war, are [not] free under the doctrine of
sovereignty, to follow any cou~se of action they care to in regard to
their relations with the employees irrespective of the effects of a particular policy upon the prosecution of the war." 20 Asserting that the
doctrine of sovereignty "i's not a suicidal doctrine," he pointed out that
the President could take action to carry on a service or function, a
threat to which might impede the successful prosecution 6f the war.
The- line of demarcation was indicated in the statement fhat in the
present case, while the disputes "have reached serious proportions," the
unions agreed not to strike and the local governments can handle the
disputes. 21
28
S. Hearings on S.J. Res. 91, 78th Cong., 1st sess., Nov. 8 and 9, 1943 (Committee on Interstate Commerce).
28
a. Pub. L. 383, 78th Cong., 2d sess., approved and effecth•e June 30, 19447
at§ 202.
24
Municipal Government, City of Newark, NWLB Nos. 47, 726, 5 War Lab.
Rep. 286 at 286 (1942); l War Lab. Rep. 46 (1942).
25
5 id. at 286.
26
Id. at 289.
27
Id. at 292.
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While recognizing the serious implications of an· assumption of
jurisdiction by the federal government of disputes between cities or
states and their employees, the board's decision is not free from question. ·The working conditions of persons in private employment, like
those of state employees, are normally under the jurisdiction of the
_state governments, not of the federal government.28 The same wartime
conditions which permit the federal government to exercise power over
the employees of private employers justify the exercise of control over
the working conditions of public employees.20 There is common sense
in the statement of the panel majority that "the activities of municipal
employees, may be, and in this case are, just as intimately connected
with the war effort as those of other employees." 30
The board itself has delegated the exercise of its authority over
labor disputes to its regional boards 31 and to a number of commissions
with decisional authority over specific industries. Examples are the
New York Metropolitan Milk Distributors Commission,82 West Coast
.Lumber Commission/8 Non-Ferrous Metals Commission,8' Tool and
Die Commission,85 Trucking Commission,86 and the Shipbuilding Commission.37
, The authority of each of these bodies is final subject to review by
the National War Labor Board upon its own motion or the ·petition of
an aggrieved party.88 Appeal under the board's rules is not a matter of
right, and the grounds therefor are strictly circumscribed.89
28

See e.g., Senn v. Tile Layers Protective Union, 301 U.S. 468, 57 S. Ct. 857
(1937).
29
The Act of Oct. 2, 1942, 56 Stat. L. 765, applies to the employees of federal
and state governments. See NWLB General Order No. IZ-B, 8 War Lab. Rep. XVIII
delegating authority to state, county and municipal governments to determine the
wages of their respective employees, provided that the principles of the stabilization
program were followed.
'
so Municipal Government, City of Newark, NWLB Nos. 47, 726, 5 War Lab.
Rep. 286 at 304 (1942), mentioned supra note 24.
,
31
See Regulations Governing Jurisdiction and Procedure of Regional War Labor
Boards, § 802.51 et seq.,.C.C.H. IA LABOR LAW SERVICE, p. 11075 et seq.
32
New York, New Jersey Metropolitan Milk Distributors War Conservation
Committee, NWLB No. 197, 3 War Lab. Rep. VII (1943).
88
Willamette Valley Lumber Operators, NWLB Nos. 69 et al, 5 War Lab. Rep.
XVI (194z).
3
• 4 War Lab. Rep. LVII (1942}, 5 id. XIV (1942).
85
Order, Dec. II, 1942, NWLB Release B-346, Dec. 14, 1942. Cited in C.C.H.
IA LABOR LAW SERVICE, p. 13,155, ,r 13,218.
86
5 War Lab. Rep. xv (1942), 6 id. XL (1943), IO id'. XXVII (1943).
87 6 War Lab. Rep. XXXIII (~943}, IO War Lab. Rep. XXIX (1943).
88
C.C.H. 'IA LABOR LAw SERVICE, p. I 1064, § 802.38.
39
Ibid; Oregon-Washington Plywood Co., NWLB No. 256, 7 War Lab. Rep.
522 (1943); Coos Bay Logging Co., NWLB No. 379, 9 War Lab. Rep. 447 (1943).
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The board has refused to exercise its authority in several cases,
sometimes acting in reliance upon the procedural limitations set forth
in Executive Order 9or7. Thus, it has rejected disputes arising from
attempts to change the terms of an existing collective labor agreement.4.0 It h<\,5 often referred parties to their grievance or arbitration
machinery under collective labor agreements,41 or it has returned disputes to them for further negotiation.42 In addition, it has recently
directed parties to arbitrate their disputes, notwithstanding t:he absence
of a contract obligation to that e:ffect.48 It has frequently refused, in
the course of its decisions, to pass upon certain matters which _it regard~d
as an interference in the internal affairs of labor unions,'4 or with certain employer prerogatives such as choice of supervisory ern:ployees.4s
But the board, unlike the National Defense Mediation !Board, has
shown little fear of passing upon so-called jurisdictional a:isputes, as
noted below.46
·
ARBITRATION

The board has assumed jurisdiction over the field of industrial arbitration..47 While not superseding the courts, it exercises concurrent authority over this subject which was previously under the exclusive
40

Postal Telegraph-Cable Co., NWLB No. 86, 1 War Lab. Rep. 83 (1942)..
Babcock & Wilcox Co., NWLB No. 68, 3 War Lab. Rep. 158 (1942); American Enka Corp., NWLB No. 182, 6 War Lab. Rep. 343 (1943); North American
Aviation, Inc., NWLB No. 2435-D, 10 War Lab. Rep. 315 (1943).
42
Chrysler Corp., NWLB No. 3950-D, 10 War Lab. Rep. 551 (1943).
48
Electric-Vacuum Cleaning Co., NWLB No. u-3659-HO, Region v, IZ War
· Lab. Rep. 183 (1943) (no contract); Aluminum Compan:( of Ameri~) NWLB No.
64, 5 War Lab. Rep. 84 (1942), overruling contrary decision in Midland Steel Products Co.~ NWLB No. 85, 1 War Lab. Rep. 247 (1942).
44
Darr School of Aeronautics, Inc., NWLB No. II 1-2879-D, 14 War Lab. Rep.
535 (1944); R. K. Griffin Co., NWLB 1n-3742-HO, Region m, 14 War Lab. Rep.
407 (1944); Humble Oil & Refining Co., NWLB No. u1-1819-D, 15 War Lab.
Rep. 380 (1944).
46
Winchester Repeating Arms Co., NWLB No. 443, 6 War Lab. Rep. 359
(1943).
•
The board's repeated failure in dispute cases to grant sick benefits and its expressed doubts as to jurisdiction over severance pay disputes is incomprehensible in view
of its broad powers under the War Labor Disputes Act.
See e.g., Strand Baking Co., NWLB No. AR-5, 5 War Lab. Rep. 262 (1942)
and Johns-Manville Co., NWLB No. IIl-2526-D, 14 War Lab. Rep. 266 (nj44)
(~ick leave); American Brake Shoe and Fot!.ndry Co., NWLB No. 1.11-1490-D, 17
War Lab. Rep. 23 (1944) (military severance pay).
46
Fall River Textile Mills, NWLB No. 1 II-5334-D, 14 War I..ab. Rep. 2II
(1944); Electric Auto-Lite Co., NWLB No. III-1894-D, 1·5 War Lab. Rep.. 312
( 1944).
47 Statement of Policy Concerning Review of Arbitration Awards, WLB Press
Release B-970, issued Sept. 10, 1943; Rules of Organization and Procedure, § 802.28
et seq., I I War Lab. Rep. x et seq.
41
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control of the judiciary. The board will not only compel labor and
management to arbitrate their disputes, as hereinabove indicated. It
will enforce, modify and vacate awards in labor cases whether the
arbitration was had pursuant to board directive or to contract provisions. 48 However, it makes a distinction between wage awards and nonwage awards.
Non-wage awards, pursuant to agreement that they will be final or
to board order m,aking no provision for review, are not reviewable on
the merits. 49 According to a recent statement of board policy,5° they
will be modified only to the extent that the arbitrator exceeds the terms
of the submission agreement. Such awards which provide for board
review will be given "the same weight accorded to the report and
recommendations of a hearing officer." 51 If this award results from
private arbitration, rather than from board order, it will not be reviewed by the board except as a dispute after certification in the usual
manner.
Wage issues are treated differently because of the board's responsibility for the wage stabilization program. Awards resulting from p:i;ivate arbitration may, of course, come before the board in the form of
voluntary agreements, where neither party contests its rendition or its
conformance to the wage stabilization program. They are then treated
like all other applications for approval.
The award inay come to the board as a dispute after a party to it
alleges it to be in violation of the national wage stabilization program.
, The board will then give weight to the award, and in particular to the
findings of fact. It will, however, seek to determine "whether the arbitrator has correctly applied all criteria of the Board's wage policy to
the facts of the case." 52 The board will examine into "what the arbitrator may have omitted to do as well as into the propriety of what he
48
Instructions to Regional Boards in Cases of Non-Compliance with Arbitration
Awards, Press Release 13-1365, March 14, 1944, 14 War. Lab. Rep. xx1x; Winchester Repeating Arms Co., NWLB No. 2571-CS-D, 15 War Lab. Rep. 666 (1944).
49 Rules of Organization and Procedure, § 802.28 et seq., I I War Lab. Rep. x
et seq., mentioned supra note 47; Sullivan Dry Dock and Repair Co., NWLB No. 565,
6 War Lab. Rep. 467 {Feb. 13, 1943), although the parties in their submission
agreement provided that either might seek board review.
50 Statement of Policy Concerning Review of Arbitration Awards, WLB Press Release B-970, issued Sept. IO, 1943, mentioned supra note 47; Smith and Wesson Co.,
NWLB No. 111-1262-D, IO War Lab. Rep. 148 (1943).
51
Statement of Policy Concerning Review of Arbitration Awards, WLB Press Release B-970, issued Sept. IO, 1943.
52
lbid; Rules of Organization and Procedure, §_802.31{a), II War Lab. Rep. x
et seq.
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has actually done." 58 It may then approve, modify or disapprove the
award or refer the matter back to the arbitrator with advice as to board
policy for reconsideration. 54
Wage awards resulting from arbitration under board order are
given the weight of a hearing officer>s report. They are, however, very
infrequent since, except in cases involving the establishment of job
classifications, the board normally will prefer to dispose of the wage
issues itself. 55
THE NATURE OF THE DISPUTE

Not all disputes, of course, come within the jurisdiction of the
National War Labor Board. Its authority is limited to "labor disputes."
The board has very properly given this term the broad meaning to
which it is entitled under the numerous decisions interpreting the
Norris-LaGuardia Act 56 and the various state anti-injunction laws,
viz., all disputes between unions or employees and employers relating
to terms and conditions of employment. 57 Rarely has the board declined to act on the ground that something other than a labor dispute
was involved. One such case involved the Mi1'J/J1,eapolis and St. Paul
Milk Distributors 58 where the board refused to determine the extent
and manner of curtailments of deliveries on the ground th$,t the matter
was subject to the jurisdiction of the Office of Defense Transportation.
The board has also refused to render decisions on matters subject to the
jurisdiction of the Office of Price Administration,59 or the War Manpower Commission. 60 On the other hand, in a recent case involving
certain music record producers, the board held that it was dealing with
58
This phrase app~ars in the Statement of Policy Concerning Review of Arbitration Awards, WLB Press Release B-970 of Sept. Io, 1943, first mentioned supra note
47. The Rules of Organization and Procedure, II War Lab. Rep. x at§ 802.31(a),
first mentioned supra note 47, substituted this expression, "If it appean to the Board
or its agent that the arbitrator has manifestly erred in applying or failing to apply any
material aspect of the Board's wage stabilization policy. . . ."
·
54
lbid.
55 Conestoga 'Fransportation Co., NWLB No. I l 1-5 l 59-D, Region m, 15 War
Lab. Rep. 597 (1944).
56
Act of March 23, 1932, Pub. L. 65, 72d Cong., 1st sess., 47 Stat. L. 70; 29
U.S.C.A. (1940) §§ 101-II5.
57
Id. at § II3.
58
Minneapolis Milk Distributors, NWLB No. 850, 7- War Lab. Rep. 5n .
(1943); Saint Paul Milk Distributors, NWL:B No. 881, 7 id. 514 (1<g-43).
59
Coal Truckers Assn., NWLB No. 139, 3 War Lab. Rep. 169 (1942).
60
See e.g., Weyerhauser Timber Co., NWLB No. I I 1-3525-O, West Coast Lumber Commission, 13 War Lab. Rep. 424 (1943).
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a labor dispute. 61 One might well inquire what position the board
would have taken in a dispute such as that between the west coast fishermen and their employers. The Supreme Court recently held that the
Norris-LaGuardia Act did not apply to this type of dispute since it was
not a l~bor dispute, the fishermen being "independent business men,"
not employees. 62 In a case like this, it is possible that the board would
have given greater breadth to the term "labor dispute." The board has
disregarded the limitations of the Norris-La Guardia Act by passing
upon jurisdictional and other inter-union controversies outside that
statute's definition of a labor dispute. 68
CONNECTION WITH THE WAR

In view of the fact that this is a wartime federal agency, the most
frequent question that arises is this: what is the necessary relationship
between the dispute and the prosecution of the war? An examination
of the executive orders and statutes involved, a study of the board's
decisions, and a realistic appraisal of the .Jabor situation in wartime
necessarily brings us to this conclusion: every labor dispute affects the
war and every labor dispute is subject to the board's jurisdiction.
Jt is true that Executive Order 9017 describes "the procedure for
adjusting and settling labor disputes which might interrupt work which
contributes to the effective prosecution 0£ the war." 64 However, this
statement is procedural, rather than substantive. Also, the board did
state in the Little Steel case that the "effect of the dispute upon the
war effort • • . is the criterion which determines the Board's jurisdiction." 65 But neither statement answers the basic question, viz~, what is
the meaning of the expression "contributes to the effective prosecution
of the war."
The intention of the President in framing this order must be interpreted in the-light of the proceedings which led to its issuance_. As
noted above, the executive order was the result of an employer-labor
conference held at the White House on December 17, I 941. That
81 Electrical Transcription Manufacturers, NWLB No. II 1-2499-D, 10 War
Lab. Rep. 157 (1943). See also United States v. American Federation of Musicians,
318 U.S. 741, 63 S. Ct. 665 (1943).
62
Columbia River Packers Assn. v. Hinton, 315 U.S. 143, 62 S. Ct. 520 (1942).
88
See cases cited supra note 46; Young Women's Christian Assn.:, NWLB No.
AR-641-D, Region XI, 8 War Lab. Rep. 454 (1943); Friun-Colnon Contracting Co.,
NWLB No. II 1-1934-D, IO War Lab. Rep. 145 (1943); Southwestern Bell Teleph@ne Co., NWLB No. 660, 8 War Lab. Rep. 80 (1943).
84 1 War Lab. Rep. XVII at§ 3, mentioned supra note 2.65 1 War Lab. Rep. 324 at 351 (1942), mentioned supra note 15.
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conference reached an agreement that "there should be no strikes or
lockouts." There was no limitation of this pledge to disputes in war
production or in industries dire€tly related to the war, such as transportation and communication. In this respect, the statement of policy of
the conference paralleled that of the 191 8 employer-management conference which agreed likewise without limitation that "there should be
no strikes or lockouts." 116 The President's letter to the coaference in
194-1 stated: "I accept without reservations your covenants that there
should be no strikes or lockouts and that all disputes shall be settled by
peaceful means." His executive order described the agreement th'usly:
"for the duration of the war there shall be no strikes or lockouts, and
that all labor disputes shall be settled by· peaceful means, and that a
National War Labor Board be established for the peaceful adjustment
of such disputes." 67
For a year and a h,alf, the board has increasingly recognized the
importance of carrying out this agreement and of determining all labor
disputes. In one of the earliest cases involving a challenge to its jurisdiction, the Montgomery Ward case,68 it found that a company engaged
in the manufacture of civilian mat~rials was subject to Executive Order
9017 and to its jurisdiction. The board pointed out that th~usands of
workers were directly or indirectly involved and that a strike in a' particular plant might have serious effect upon civilian morale generally.
It stated: 88
. "But the most important question is not what effect a strike
in Chicago would have on the company's business there and elsewhere, but what effect it would have on industrial relation's generally and particularly on industrial relations in plants direetly producing or distributing war materials. If 5500 workers of
Montgomery Ward may properly strike in Chicago for higher
wages and union security-the chief issues in this dispute-it seems
to us almost certain that others workers in other establishments
WRuld feel that they should have the same right, and that once a
1111

The Prodamation of the President, April 8, 1918, creating the first National
War Labor Board was somewhat more limited in its delegation of authority, and that
board dismissed almost fifty complaints on the ground that war produi:tion was not
involved. The National War Labor Board, Bulletin of the U.S. Bur:eau of Labor
Statistics, No. 287, p. 13 (Dec. 1921).
87 The President's letter, I War Lab. Rep. at xiv and Exec. Order 9017, I War
Lab. Rep. xvn, mentioned supra note 2.
118
Montgomery Ward & Co., NWLB No. 192, I War Lab. Rep •. 28'0 (1942).
011
Id. at 284. See Hotel Employees of San Francisco, NWLB No. 21, I War Lab.

Rep. 91 (1941).
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strike of the dimensions which are here threatened, against an employer as well-known as Montgomery Ward, and in an area as
highly industrialized as Chicago, were allowed to take place on
the theory that this Board lacked authority to deal with the dispute, a fire would be started which before very long might turn
into a conflagration.
"We do not think that the workers, or the general public for
that matter, would grasp clearly the distinction which the company
seeks to make between concerns producing or distributing war materials and those producing or distributing non-war materials. We
do not think that it would be possible as a practical matter, to have
one part of industry free to indulge in strikes and lockouts, and
another part bound to submit their disputes to this Board and to
forego strikes and lockouts."
The board suggested in the same opinion, that "very good arguments can be made in support of the proposition that any labor dispute,
no matter how minor in nature, is most certain, at least in some degree,
to register a detrimental effect upon the war effort." 70 That was on·
June 29, 1942. Nine months later, the board finally accepted those
arguments in the Reuben H. Donnelly case 71 lJ,nd came to the conclusion that "any labor dispute of whatever nature which threatens to
result in a strike or lockout does, in fact, affect the prosecution of the
war on the home front."
The board's conclusion was grounded upon the unlimited scope of
the no-strike pledge and the fact that "the maintenance of a sound domestic economy is essential to the war effort." As the board stated: 72
"A threatened strike or lockout in any community in the land
is bound to disturb and disrupt the economic life of the community.
Thus, a strike in a so-called non-essential industry, such as any
one of the service industries, is likely to have very serious consequences on industrial relations in the community."
The corollary of this jurisdictional principle was recently stated by
the board in the Allis-Chalmers case in which Vice-Chairman Taylor
wrote: 73
" ... the moral obligation not to strike in war time remains.
It might be argued that Section 8 of .the [War Labor
Disputes]
.
70
Montgomery Ward & Co., NWLB No. 192, l War Lab. Rep. 280 at 285
(1942).
71
NWLB No. 4207, 7 War Lab. Rep. 198 at 205 (1943).
72
lbid.
78
NWLB No. III-35n-D., II War Lab. Rep. 518 at 520 (1943).
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Act is inconsistent with the concept of a no-strike agreemem.t. But
a careful consideration of Section 8 reveals the unsoundness of this
argument.
,
"In the :first place, the section is limited to the plants of 'war
contractors.' ,The definition of this term in Section 2 ( c) is such
as to exclude from its coverage important segments of th~ economy in cases where no war contract is involved. Surely Congress
must have intended that in these and other segments of tlie economy excluded from the operation of Section 8 the no-strike agreement should continue to be effective ... Obviously, the nq-strike
agreement must cover the whole economy, as its terms previded,
or else cease to be."
This decision resulted in part from the second important develqp,ment in the history of the board, namely, its assumption of jurisdiction
over virtually all voluntary wage increases, irrespective of the natwre
of the work involved. The act of October 2, I 942, authqrizes the
President to "provide for making adjustments with. respect to prices,
wages, and salaries, to the extent that he :finds necessary to aid in the
effective prosecution of the war or to correct gross inequities." 7 The
President's order, No. 9250, was predicated upon the stated need "to
control so far as possible the inflationary tendencies and the. ~ast dislocations attendant thereon which threaten our. military effort and our
domestic economic structure, and for the more effective prosecution of ·
the war." 75 Title II of that order provides inter alia that:
4,

"No increases in wage rates, granted as a result of voluntary
agreement, collective bargaining, conciliation, arbitration, or otherwise, and no decrease in wage rates, shall be authorized unless
notice of such -increases or decreases shall have been :filed with the
National War Labor Board, and unless the National War Labor
Board has approved such increases or decreases."
In order to remove any question, the order further provides in Title
III, section I, that:
"Except as modified by this Order, the National War La~or
Board shall continue to perform the powers, functions, and duties
conferred upon it by Executive Order No. 9017, and the.functions
of said Board are hereby extended to cover all industr~es and all
employees. The National War Labor Board shall continue to
follow the procedures specified in said Executive. Order."
7

~

75

56 Stat. L. 756, enacting clause, first mentioned supra note 8.
4 War Lab. Rep. vm, first mentioned supra note 7:
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This section· permits' of two constructions ( 1) that the President
expressly extended the power of the board over labor disputes, including those involving wages, to "all industries and all employees";
( 2) that the phrase refers to control over wages alone.
Whichever the intention of this section, it is clear that Executive
Orders 9017 and 9250 must be read together and applied together.
Wage disputes and wage negotiations are major items in employerunion relations. They cannot possibly be separated from non-wage
issues. One cannot take away from unions and employers this aspect of
their labor relations and leave them free to engage in strikes, lockouts
and picketing with respect to the other aspects of their disputes. For
one thing, wages are usually inextricably related to the other working
conditions. This is the result, in part, of the give and take of negotiations. More fundamentally, there is a close connection among such
matters as wages, hours, vacations, sick leave, the skill of fellow employees, the application of seniority provisions and the hundreds of
other matters which are virtually inseparable in a collective bargaining
agreement. Those being the facts of industrial life, knowledge of them
may reasonably be imputed to the draftsmen of the two executive
orders.
Notwithstanding the foregoing, the board in October 1943, rendered "a tentative opinion" 76 in which it came to certain extraordinary
conclusions in respect either to its jurisdiction or to the exercise of its
jurisdiction;-which, it is not entirely clear. Chairman William H.
Davis, writing for the board's majority, referred to "the necessity of
· disposing by machinery other than certification to this Board of those
issues and disputes which constitute a less .important and substantial
threat to war production." He said: 11
"In an effort to meet the p~oblem, the Board has conferred
with representatives of the United States Conciliation Service. We
have discussed with them the necessity of disposing by machinery
other than certification to this Board, of those issues and disputes
which constitute a less important and substantial threat to war produttion. No inflexible rules were formulated; though administra76
.
Simon J. Murphy Co., NWLB No. 1n-1228-D, California Packing Corp.,
NWLB No. I I 1-549-D, WLB Press Release B-1066, issued Oct. 26, 1943, I I War
Lab. Rep., No. 8, xiv et seq. These cases were in the advance sheets, vol. I 1, No. 8,
and were not reprinted in the bound volume 1 1 because of the tentative character of
the opinions. Criticized by this writer in "Administrative Abdication," 3 LAw. GUILD
REV. 43 et seq. (Nov.-Dec. 1,943. See note I supra in regard to hearings on these cases.
77
WLB Press Release B-1066, Simon J. Murphy Co., California Packing Corp.,
II War Lab. Rep., No. 8, xiv (1943).
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tive guides were discussed. Jt is hoped that by the gradual process
of inclusion and exclusion in the handling of individual cases,
principles will emerge which will indicate with some definitiveness the types of cases which the Board believes appropriate for
certification and those which more appropriately lend them.selyes
to settlement by some other means. It is for this reason that the
Board has combined its opinions in the above-entitled cases. At the
same time, emphasis should be placed upon the fact that this
action has been taken primarily for administrative reasons .rather
than in definition of the limits of the Board's jurisdiction."
The theory of this waiver of jurisdiction was that the board's work
was obstructed by its heavy case load. The chairman stated that this
was the effect of the referral to the board "of the issues and disputes of
· minor nature," and that "it is more th.an ever neeessary in war.time that
the peaceful processes of collective bargaining be preserved.and utilized
to the fullest extent."
While no one can differ with the board's,view that collective bargaining constitutes a more satisfactory mode of determining• disputes
than decisions by the board itself, it is extremely difficult to aippreciate
the rationale of its decision or to contemplate without disturlbance the
untoward effects of that decisjon. One may question whether the
board's work is impeded by the referral to it of disputes of a "minor
nature." The board's heavy case load was and is due primariiy to the
fact that under Executive Order 9250 it has jurisdiction of voluntary
wage applications. 78 It is these rather than the dispute cases tfo_l.t occupy
most ·of the board's time and that have caused tiie complained~of backlog. Secondly, the board in using the term "disputes of a minor nature"
was referring less to the nature of the dispute than to the industry or
occupation in which it takes place. The boa~d really meant that it might
refuse to accept non-war cases, no matter how important or clif.licult the
issues involved, and that it might continue to take those cases involving
war production even though the dispute were of a minor nature more
properly disposed of through collective bargaining.
No such demarcation between disputes involving war production
, and those which do not can be made by the bo~rd under the statutes or
executive orders upon which its 'jurisdiction and powers are grounded.
A board which has repeatedly takeri disputes involving hotel and
78
See e.g., Sixth Monthly Report of the National Wat' Labor Board to the
United States Senate of Oct. 2, 1943. WLB Press Release B-1030, ~ 3· (Oct. 10,

1943).
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restaurant workers,79 office workers,80 and salesmen 81 .cannot at this
late date refuse jurisdiction to workers who do not engage in so-called
war production.
To the extent that the board does have a heavy case load of disputes, the answer is obvious. As the labor members state in their dissenting opinion,82 it is the board's duty to work out more efficient
metl:10ds of administration, to request an increase in personnel from
Congress if necessary, and otherwise to employ new administrative
techniques, all of which would be preferable to a waiver of jurisdiction.
_ The consequences of the board's action if unchanged, would have been
these: first, a nullification of its previous decisions and particularly, that
Qf the Reuben H. Donnelly case; 83 second, an incitement to employers
of non-war workers to refuse to bargain collectively and to evade what
the board refers to as a moral duty to settle labor disputes; third, either
the presentation to workers in non-war industries of the right to strike,
which would be contrary to public policy,84 or an insistence that they
continue to fulfill their no-strike pledge, without giving them any
forum for the final determination of their labor disputes.
It will be noted that this opinion was described as "tentative." It
was announced at a public hearing at which representatives of organized
labor appeared in opposition to the contemplated proposals therein set
forth. 85 Unfortunately, however, a number of regional boards immediately began to carry out the principles set forth in that opinion.86 One
board, by resolution, has vigorously expressed its objections to this
waiver of jurisdiction. That was the Twelfth Regional Board which
resolved that since labor had given up its strike weapon and since the
79 Hotel Employers Association of San Francisco, NWLB No. 21, I War Lab.
Rep. 91 (1942); Young Women's Christian Assn., NWLB No.-AR-641-D, Region xi,
8 War Lab. Rep. 454 (1943).
80
Security Title & Guarantee Co., NWLB No. 646, 4 War Lab. Rep. 344
(1942); J.S. B~che & Co., NWLB No. 612, 4 War Lab. Rep. 345 (194.2).
81
E.g., Reuben-H. Donnelly Corp., NWLB No. 4207, 7 War Lab. Rep. 198
(1943), mentioned supra note 71.
82
Simon J. Murphy Co., California Packing Corp., WLB Press Release B-1066a,
Oct. 31, 1943, mentioned supra note 76.
83
NWLB No. 4207, 7 War Lab. Rep. 198 (1943), mentioned supra note 71.
84
See Montgomery-Ward decision, NWLB No. 192, r War Lab. Rep. 280
(1942), mentioned supra note 68.
85
See note r supra.
86
I.E. lllgenfritz' Sons, NWLB No. 1 u-2465-D, Region x1, 12 War Lab. Rep.
700 at 701 (1943) where a dispute involving nursery stock was rejected on the ground
that "a nursery does not so vitally affect the war effort that further attention to this
case is warranted." · The same regional board recently refused to investigate a strike
on the ground that it did not affect war production.
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War Labor Board has jurisdiction over all disputes "we.should be in a
difficult and illogical position if we refuse to act in cases of this kind." 87
The board has not explicitly withdrawn from the position -taken in
its "tentative opinion." It did, however, render a final opinion ·on the
jurisdictional issue in which no reference is made t6 the neeessity for
the discriminatory acceplance of labor disputes. In the Simon J...
Mwrphy 88 case it reasserted its jurisdiction over the cases in which "the
employer is [not] directly occupied in the production or transportation
of war goods." Special emphasis was placed upon the fact 'that "the
practical achievement of the purpose to which the War Labor Disputes
Act is directed requires that the Board should not disregard the possibility of a strike in one establishment spreading to other establishments." 89
- It is true that the board also emphasized the possibility "0,f damage
to the war effort or to war production," 90 but the entire approach to the
problem is radically different from that of its original -"tentative
opinion." We believe that the board has now come to a conclusion m0re
in consonance with the no-strike agreement and the original intent of
Executive Order 9017.
AGRICULTURAL WORKERS

Agricultural workers are notoriously in the greatest need of governmental assistance. For the most part they are unorgaµ~zed. The
statutory protection of the right to self-organization has no~ been e:ictended to them. The social benefits of such legislation as-the ijair Labor
Standards Act,91 and the Social Security Act- 92 are withheld-fi-:'bm them.
Yet their importance to the community in time of peace and even more
in time of war is manifest.
One might consequently have expected that the board, -which-has
placed such emphasis upon the war character of the objects- of its jurisdiction, would hasten to settle disputes among agricultural workers.
The contrary is true. The board has hesitated to settle cases involving
these workers. It has conceded "that agriculture is vitally necessary to
87

Information received from that agency.
Simon J. Murphy Co., NWLB No. II1-1228-D, 14 War Lab. Rep. 7 at 9
(Feb. 4, 1944). See same case supra note 76. See also Merchant Tailors Assn.,
NWLB No. II1-3816-HO, Region v, 14 War Lab. Rep. 302 (1944).
89
Simon J. Murphy Co., NWLB No. II 1-1228-D, 14 War Lab. Rep. 7 at 9
(1944).
.
90
Ibid.
91
52 Stat. L. rn6o at§ 213 (1938); 29 U.S.C.A. (1940) at§ 213:
92
53 Stat. L. 174 (1939); 26 U.S.C.A. (1940) §§ 1400-1426.
88
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the successful prosecution of the war." 98 But it came forward-at least
temporarily-with a new exception to its rule that impact upon the war
is the basic criterion. The board originally evolved what may be
characterized as an isolationist theory for the purpose of placing agricultural workers outside its jurisdiction. In the test case on the subject,
it said:
" ••. this is not a situation in which a labor difficulty may spread
to related or adjacent occupations or plants. The work of these
employees is performed-On farms in relatively isolated areas. The
record before us does not reveal any present danger of this dispute
spreading to adjacent war centers." 94
This extraordinary conclusion was a complete turnabout of the
board's original thinking on this subject. It will be recalled that originally many employers argued that only cases directly related to the
war were within the board's jurisdiction. The board met this in the
Montgomery Ward case 95 by pointing out that even if the war were
not directly involved, an assumption of jurisdiction was justified by the
danger that the dispute might spread to neighboring war plants. Now,
in this agricultural case, the board was stating that in the absence of the
second, and admittedly minor ground, it would not act, notwithstanding the existence of the first and primary ground of ,jurisdiction.
The benefits of the National Labor Relations Act have been denied
agricultural workers in the past for reasons of administrative or political expediency.96 The same reasons make it inadvisable in the view of
many to have their disputes under the aegis of the National War Labor
Board. There is no good reason, however, why these workers should
not have the right even in peacetime to bargain collectively and to determine through their unions the conditions under which they will
work. The right to self-organization and collective bargaining has
~en described by the Supreme Court as fundamental 97 · and thus has
98
California Packing Corp., WLB Press Release B-1066, II War Lab. Rep., No.
8, XIV at XVII (1943), mentioned supra note 76. The importance to the war effort of
an adequate food supply has been expressly recognized by the board, Federated Fishing
Boat of New England, NWLB Nos. 16, 16a, 1 War Lab. Rep. 1, 83, 86 (1942).
91 California Packing Corp., WLB Press Release B-1066, II War Lab. Rep., No:
8, XIV at XVlll (1943).
9
~ I War Lab. Rep. 280 (1942), mentioned supra note 68.
96
Pan.el report, California Packing Corp., of June I I, 1943 (unreported); see
board decision in same case, supra note 76 and infra note 98; S. Rep. No. 573 on S.
1958, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 7, May 1, 1·935; H. Rep. No. 1147 on S. 1958, 74th
Cong., 1st sess., June 10, 193 5, minority report_ of Mr. Marcantonio at p. 26.
97
Amalgamated Utility Workers v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 .U.S. 261 at
263, 60 S. Ct. 561 (1940).
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necessa,rily antedated the passage of the National Labor Relations Act.
In at least one state, the right has been constitutionally gtiaranteed to
all workers, notwithstanding the absence of an administrati-ve procedure
for the enforcement by certain types of employees of these rights.98
In wartime however, the issues transcend those revolving about individual rights. It has been shown that the effective and uninterrupted
prosecutio'n of the war requires the settlement of labor displ!ltes either
through collective bargaining or the determination of a: tribunal such
as the National War Labor Board. The refusal of the board to enter the
agric~tural field can be supported today upon no reasonable ground.
On reconsideration, following the protests of organiud labor, the
board modified its position without changing its disposition of the dispute.99 It refused to decide the repr:esentation issue for tl;ie reasons
noted below. The issue of jurisdiction was met with the statement
that "the board is not called upon in this case to determine it.s jurisdiction over other types of disputes that may arise between agricultural
laborers and their employers. If and when an appropriate case is presented, the Board will make that determination, although it is pertinent
to point out that the War Food Administrator, not-the War Labor
Board, has jurisdiction over voluntary or agree-upon adju~trnents in
wages of agricultural employees not in excess of $-5 ,ooo per .year." 100
The reference to the jurisdiction of the War Food Ad~inistrator
over voluntary adjustments has little meaning in a discussion of jurisdiction over disputes. However, this extraneous interjection may be
disregardeq. in view of the board's explicit reservation of decision upon
the jurisdictional issue. The precise meaning of its remarks ·is discussed
below. Suffice it to say at this point, the board will probably take
jurisdiction over disputes involving wages and conditions of employment affecting agricultural workers as well as any other workers even
though it will continue to refuse a determination of the issue of exclusive representation.
INTERSTATE COMMERCE

Employers opposing the board's actions have frequently taken the
position that the board's jurisdiction is limited to disputes affecting
interstate commerce.101 The board has, without exception, overruled
98

N.Y. Const., Art 1, § 17.
California Packing Corp., NWLB No. I I 1-549-D, 14 War 1/-lh. Rep. 1-0
(Feb. 4, 1944).
100
Ibid.
101
Brooklyn Central Young Men's Christian Assn., NWLB No. III-1286-Di IO
War Lab. Rep. 376 (1943); Colorado Spring Grocery & Meat Markets, NWLB No.
99
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such objections and has consistently acted in intrastate disputes.102 The
reasons for this are clear and may be stated simply.
The board is not operating under the interstate commerce power
given to Congress under the Constitution. Obviously, it could not have
done so un,der the executive orders which were the sole foundation of
its existence and powers until June of r943. For it is Congress, not the
President, which has been given the power to regulate interstate commerce.103 The board was created under the war powers of the federal
government and has acted under those powers since its creation. Executive Order 9017 is expressly predicated upon "the state of war de-·
dared to exist by joint resolution of Congress" and "the national
interest (which) demands that there shall be no interruption of any
work which contributes to the effective prosecution of the war." 104 The
War Labor Disputes Act1° 5 which gives the board what is referred to
as its statutory basis expressly makes its jurisdiction dependent upon
the effect of the labor dispute on the war.
The war powers of the federal. government have not hitherto been
regarded as limited to matters affecting interstate commerce.106 Their
exercise by the President and by Congress in connection with war labor
disputes does not impose any new limitation. The board seems to have
taken the position that any labor dispute is subject to its jurisdiction because of the possible effect of a breach of the no-strike agreement upon
community morale as well as upon our civilian economy. This being so,
any distinction between intrastate and interstate commerce is completely immaterial and improperly disregards what has been referred
to as "i~portant segments of the economy in cases where no war contract is involved." 101
THE NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS AcT

It wilrbe recalled that Executive Order 9or7 provides that "nothing herein shall be construed as superseding or in conflict wit~ ... the
111-887-D, 13 War Lab. Rep. 113 (1943); Simon J. Murphy Co., NWLB No. 1111228-D, WLB Press Release B-1066, II War Lab. Rep., No. 8, xiv, mentioned
supra notes 76_ and 88; Southern Servi\:e Co., Ltd., NWLB No. l l 1-358-C, Region
x, 8 War Lab. Rep. 442 (1943).
1;02 Ibid. See also NWLB Resolution of July 12, 1944, 17 War Lab. Rep., No. 1,
XXVII.

103 U.S. Const., Art. 1, § 8.
104 1 War Lab. Rep. xvn ( l 942).
105 57 Stat. L. 163 (1943).

08
~
See Schenck v. United States, 249 U.S. 47, 39 S. Ct. 247 (1919); United
States v. MacIntosh, 283 U.S. 605, 51 S. Ct. 570 (1931).
107 Allis-Chalmers Co., NWLBNo. 111-3511-D, I I War Lab. Rep. 518 at 520
(1943), mentioned supra note 73.
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National Labor Relations Act." This passage has its parallel in the War
Labor "Disputes Act passed a year and a half later which provides that
the board in making its decisions in dispute cases "shall conform to the
. provisions of . . . the National Labor Relations Act . . . an<½ all other
applicable provisions of law." 108 Presumably these provisi@ns mean,
first; that the National War Labor Board will not occupy tl:ie field of
the National Labor Relations Board either by conducting elections or by"
directing the cessation of unfair labor practices wher~ th:e- National
Labor Relations Board has power to perform either act; second, that
the National War Labor Board 'o/ill not direct parties litigant to act .
in violation of the National Labor Relations Act; and third, that
weight, possibly finality, must be given to the decisions of the National
Labor Relations Board.109
An examination of the cases shows that each of the foregoing principles has been followed by the National War Labor Board. The board
has invariably referred demands for collective bargaining to the National Labor Relations Board.110 The National War LabQr Board's
refusal to act seems proper in all such cases except where the~only issue
is that of successorship to certification rights and obligations.111 There
one may accuse it of excessive delicacy since successorship is tnot necessarily a matter within: the exclusive jurisdiction of the Nritional Labor
Relations Board. The NWLB has refused to consider the propriety of
the discharge of union members under a union shop agreement with a
rival union where the claim was made that the contract was in violation ·
108

57 Stat. L. 163 at§ 7(a) (2) (1943), mentioned supra note II.
Also, more literally, that the NWLB will not act in conflict with· the NLRB.
Thus in the recent Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co. case, NWLB No. 111-351n-D, I I War
Lab. Rep. 518 (1943), the NWLB refused to conduct an election at the instance of
one union where the NLRB had previously denied a similar request and upheld the
certification of a rival union.
110 Virginia Electric and Power Co., NWLB No. 41, I War Lab. Rep. 74'
( I 942), where the NLRB issued a company-union disestablishment orel.er later enforced by the Supreme Court, and where the NWLB requested expediti0us action by
the NLRB.
Tennessee Schuylkill Corp., NWLB No. 585, 6 War Lab. Rep. z90 (1943),
where the union's NLRB petition for certification was pending, the NWLB directed
recognition of the union "for the purpose of handling the grievances of its members"
with unsettled grievances to go to arbitration. The board also stated that 'tthe National
Labor Relations Board is requested to expedite the election in this case.'''
111
ln Easy Washing Machine Corp., NWLB No. 703, 6 War Lab. Rep. IO
(1943), the board rejected a mediator's recommendations that the company bargain
with a union which, since its certification by the NLRB, had become affiliated with ~
CIO national union. The board "recommends that the union pet.ition ·the National
Labor Relations Board for an election ••. and that the company consent to the holding of such an election." The decision of the board should at least have directed the
company to execute a stipulation of consent to the election.
109

J,
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of the Wagner'Act.112 It has in other types of cases refused to direct the
reinstatement of employees allegedly discharged for union activ.ity.113
Finality has been given the NLRB decisions with respect, partirularly, to one important matter: the appropriateness of the collective
bargaining unit.114 In several cases, the National War Labor Board has
been confronted with a request of one or the other party for the extension or limitation of a collective bargaining unit previously found appropriate by the National Labor Relations Board. In almost every such
case, the NWLB has held that the determination of the NLRB is conclusive and that the unit for which the union has been certified is t.he
unit to be set forth in the contract without expansion or contraction.115
On the other hand, the board has directed in certain cases that the same
contract cover several separate units for which the same union ( or its
affiliates) was separately certified by the National Labor Relations
Board.110 Obvio~sly, particularly in wartime, there is mutual and public advantage in the limitation of negotiations and in the determination
of as many related disputes as possible. It is even more important to
achieve thereby that uniformity of working conditions upon which
stabilization is predicated.
While the National War Labor Board has not been given the
power to supersede the National Labor Relations Board, it has not been
, forbidden to assist that agency. Litigation under the National Labor
112

1

Pearson Candy Co., Ltd., NWLB No. 11-15~C, Region x, 9 War Lab. Rep.
· 679 (1943).
113 Industrial Rubber Goods Co., NWLB No. III-3402-HO, Region x1, 13, War
Lab. Rep. 119 (1943).
114 Gerber Products Co., NWLB No. 111-2134-D, Region,x1, I2 War Lab. Rep.
74 (1943); Remington-Rand, Inc., NWLB No. 424, 7 War Lab. Rep. 183 (1943);
Wilson-Jones Co., NWLB No. 161, 3 War Lab. Rep. 312 (1942); Federal Shipbuilding and Dry Dock Co., NWLB No. 25-390-D, 12 War Lab. Rep. 39 (1943), affirming order of Shipbuilding Commission, reported at I I id. 226 (1943). See, however,
Bethlehem Steel Co., NWLB No. u7, 6 War Lab. Rep. 513 (1943).
11 ~ Ibid. However, the NWLB has not infrequently interpreted NLRB certifications by defining supervisors and by making.specific exceptions to control coverage.
See Illinois Powder Co., NWLB No. 3025-D, 10 War Lab. Rep. 79 (1943); BorgWarner Corp., NWLB No. 4246-D, 10 War Lab. Rep. 631 (1943); Federal Shipbuilding & Dry Dock Co., NWLB No. 25-3<)0-D, I I War Lab. Rep. 226 (1943);
Phelps Dodge Corp., NWLB No. 111-1529-D, II War Lab. Rep. 71 {1943).
116
Wilson & Company, Inc., NWLB No. 188, 2 War Lab. Rep. 122 {1942),
relying upon the opinion of the chairman of the NLRB. Woodward Iron Co., NWLB
No. 111-1205-D, Region 1v, IO War Lab. Rep. 473 (1943). Conversely, the board
has directed the execution of agreements for plant guards separate from production
workers. Brewster Aeronautical Corp., NWLB No. l I 1-3372-D, I I War Lab. Rep.
286 (1943); Great American Industries, NWLB No. 111-467-R, 11 War Lab. Rep.
287 (1943).
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Relations Act lacks mariy of the advantages normally attributed to the
administrative process. The investigatory proceedings, the trials before board examiners, the enforcement proceedings of the board, are
time-consuming operations. This is not a satisfactory situation even in
peacetime. It has resulted in the virtual nullification of many of theNational Labor Relations Board's decisions and in the destruction of
many unions which were unable, during the long period of litigation,
to withstand the pressure of unfair labor practices.117
In some cases, the unions were able to enforce the board's decisions
by engaging in strikes and other types of economic warfa:t,:e. Today,
however, these pressure activities have been renounced by rhe unions.
The country cannot permit violation of national labor policy, injury
to employee morale, or interference with war production. A labor dispute must be decided quickly if the fundamental' principles l[lr.1derlying
Executive Order 9017 are to be carried out.
Accordingly, the National War Labor Board early in its career instituted the laudable practice not of supplanting the National Labor
Relations Board but of supporting and enforcing its orders. Thus, the
National War Labor Board has frequently directed emp\oytrs to bargain with unions certified as the collective bargaining repr~ntative of
their employees.118 In one recent case, Shell, Oil Co. Inc.119 ·the board's

.

111

See e.g., Leonard B. Boudin, "How to Amend the Wagner Act/' 100 NEw
.
118 Electro Chemicals, Inc., NWLB No. 111-379-C, Region x, 12 War Lab. 'Rep.
So (1943), directing a shut-down firm and its "successors or agents" to bargain upon
resumption of negotiations. In Zion's Cooperative Mercantile, Inst., NWLB No. l IIIIo-D, 13 War Lab. Rep. 6 (1943), the board directed collective bargaining pursuant
to an NLRB certification despite the employer's claim of doubt as to majority representation.
In Utah Copper Co., NWLB Nos. 111-4944-D and 1u-4945-D, 14 War Lab.
Rep. 80 (1944), the NWLB modified an order of its Non-Ferrous.Metals Comm,i►
sion, 13 War Lab. Rep. 284 (1943) by recommending, rather than \iirecting, that
the employer bargain collectively with the NLRB certified unions, the commission
thereafter to fix the terms and conditions of employment upon which agreement was
not reached be~een the parties. The parties were also directed to execute a collective
agreement embodying the terms previously fixed by the commission. Accordingly, the
recommendation appears to be as mandatory as a so-called directive.
See United States Gypsum Co., NWLB No. 111-u5-D, Region x, 14 War Lab.
Rep. 388 (1944). See also Idaho Potato Growers Assn., NWLB No. i1ii-5051-D, 14
War Lab. Rep. 131 (1944) where the Eighth Regional Board directed ¢ollective bargaining in accordance with an NLRB certification and order to bargai"n collectively
based upon 'a finding that the employees were not agricultural workers. The NWLB
regarded itself as bound by the NLRB's finqing that the persons involv.ed were employees within the meaning of the National Labor Relations Act. The d«rcision in this
case was rendered during· the pendency of a petition for review of the NJ,RB order
filed by the company with the circuit court of appeals.
119
NWLB No. 92, 3 War Lab. Rep. 296 at 298 (1942).

REP. 7 (1939).

352

MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 43

order significantly provides that "the Board, recognizing the findings
. and conclusions of the National Labor Relations Board as controlling,
directs as follows: 'the Company shall recognize the union as the exclusive bargaining representative in the unit defined by the National
Labor Relations Board in Case No. R-626 ...'"
,
The suggestion has occasionally been made that employees faced·
with an employer refusal to bargain collectively with their certified
representative should file unfair labor practice charges with the National
Labor Relations .Board.120 Aside from the inefficacy of such proce:dure in wartime, it is clear that a union is not required to file such a
charge. As a War Labor Board panel recently stated: m
" ... it may, in seeking to exercise the exclusive bargaining
rights awarded it by the N.L.R.B., either file such a charge or,
at its discretion, strike. The union has accepted the award of the
N .L.R.B. and thinks it unnecessary to submit the question of the
unit to that Board for re-determination.... Out of this situation,
there has, however, arisen a dispute which threatens to interrupt
work contributing to the e:ffective prosecution of the war and for
which all remedies available through other governmental agencies
have been exhausted. It is the opinion of the undersigned, therefore, that it is altogether proper for the National War Labor
Board to assume jurisdiction of the dispute."
So much for the simple refusal to recognize the weight of an
NLRB certification. There is, however, a variety of situations involving the collective bargaining issue which may be noted briefly.
The War Labor Board will not take jurisdiction over disputes
involving representation where there has been neither prior collective
bargaining nor NLRB certification.122 These clearly are controversies
concerning representation within the meaning of section 9c of the
National Labor Relations Act.
Certifications are given much the same weight accorded· them by
. the NLRB. The War Labor. Board thus regards an NLRB certification
'less than a year old as binding upon the parties.123 Where the certifica120

See e.g., id. at 308, dissenting report ~f industry panel member.
Id. at 301-302.
12
~ NWLB-NLRB Agreement on Cases Involving Wagner Act Questions, issued
March 16, 1944, 14 War Lab. Rep. vm. •
123
See Ace Foundry Co., NWLB No. 899, 14 War Lab. Rep. 755 (1943). In the
J.S. Bache Co. case, NWLB No. I I 1-2707-D, 15 War Lab. Rep. 581 (1944) ·the Second Regional Board directed collective bargaining pursuant to a two-year-old NLRB
certification.
121
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tion is more than a year old, the NWLB should and usually does rely
upon the presumption of continuance of majority repres~ntation.iu
Presumably the same result would follow the expiration of an exclusive
collective bargaining agreement even in the absence of certification.125
The exception occurs where the facts cast doubt upon the force of the
presumption.126 If in this type of case there is a competing.union the
board will not consider its claims to representation unless it or the company has filed a. petition for certification with the NLRB prior to
certification of the dispute to the War Labor Board.127 The rationale
of this is clear: the board in the absence of a petition for certification
may properly assume that "there was no bona fide doubt as to . . .
[ the first union's] majority status." 128 If the petition was filed, its
outcome by way of its dismissal or the election results will be awaited
before the NWLB takes further action.
The National War Labor Board has also directed the reinstatement of employees in two types of cases: first, where the matter is
still pending before the National Labor Relations Board; 120 second,
1 2<1 See Montgomery-Ward & Co., NWLB No. 111-5353-HO, 13 War Lab. Rep.
454 (1944); National Carbon Co., NWLB No. 13-353-D, 14 War I.,l/-b. Rep. 21
(1944); in Commercial Iron Works, NWLB No. 111-676, 14 War La'h. Rep. 166,
the 10th Regional Board on February 4, 1944, directed the execution @f a contract,
provided that the union secure a ruling from the NLRB within sixty days; to the effect
that it was entitled to recognition. The union had won an NLRB elegtion on September 26, 1941, and the long delay was due to the NWLB and the United States
Conciliation Service. Accordingly, the conditions seem unfair. Cf. Ti~e Guarantee
and Trust Co., New York State Labor Relations Board, Case No. SE-9592, 12 Lab.
Rel. Rep. (1943).
'
125
Ibid; Los Angeles Candy Companies: NWLB No. 111-3362-D, '.17 War Lab.
Rep. 186 (1944).
.
126
See dictum in National Carbon Co., NWLB No. 13-353-D, 14 War Lab.
Rep. 21 (1944), mentioned supra note 124.
127
NWLB-NLRB Agreement on Cases Involving Wagner Act Questions, 14 War
Lab. Rep. vm.
128
Id. at xx.
129
Western Cartridge Co., NWLB No. 491, 4 War Lab. Rep. 427 (1942), involving nineteen discharges; Montag Brothers, Inc., NWLB No. 799, 6 War Lab. Rep.
355 (1943), ordering the reinstatement of strikers. An excellent panel report points
nut tl}.e distinction between NLRB and NWLB powers and recommends "that the
Board make it clear in its order that it is not exercising the powers of tlie NLRB to
reinstate employees but that it is merely recreating a status in the plant of the company as a measure of ins.uring industrial stability as a war measure, pursuant to its duly
granted powers" (p. 359); Carter Carburetor Corp., NWLB No. 148, 6 War Lab.
Rep. 565 (IC)43), where the NLRB's trial examiner had recommended the reinstatement of employees discharged on account of their participation in a strike; cf.
Winchester Repeating Arms Co., NWLB No. 443, 6 War Lab. Rep. 359 ·(1943), mentioned infra note. I 30, where the board had directed that three discharges upon which
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where the National Labor Relations Board has directed the reinstatement of these employees and enforcement proceedings are pending
before the circuit court of appeals.180 In both cases, the National War
Labor Board decision -is made without prejudice to the rights of the
employer in the event that the National Labor Relations Board or the
courts should render a contrary decision. The National War Labor
Board has acted similarly in cases involving the disestablishment of or
directions to cease recognizing labor organizations. Thus, in the Virginia Eleciric and Power Company case 181 where the National War
Labor Board had previously refused182 to direct an employer to bargain
with one union while the validity of a contract with-another was the
subject of the National Labor Relations Board enforcement proceedings, it nevertheless directed that the employer cease bargaining with
the c.ompany-uriion (involved in the unfair labor practice case) until
an election was held and a collective bargaining agent certified by the
National Labor Relations Board. In another case,188 in which the National .Labor Relations Board had disestablished a company-union, the
National War Labor Board directed that:
, "The compa~y shall c.omply with the order of'the National
Labor Relations Board disestablishing the independent union and
shall not recognize or deal with said independent union unless and
until such time as a superior court modifies or reverses the order
of the National Labor Relations Board."
The foregoing illustrates not merely admirable cooperation between government agencies, but the more effective enforcement of a
statute such as the Wagner Act by interlocutory orders. However, the
National War Labor Board has more recently indicated somewhat of
the NLRB had not yet acted be handled through the grievance machinery it set up
for a minority union. Recently the National Board reversed a regfonal board order
reinstating employees whose cases were pending before the NLRB. McGough Bakeries,
Inc., NWLB No. 1u-2275-D, 16 War Lab. Rep. 624 (1944).
180 Winchester Repeating Arms Co., NWLB No. 443, 6 War Lab. Rep. 359
(1943); Western Cartridge Co., NWLB No. 491, 4 War Lab. Rep. 427 (1942);
Borg-Warner Corp., NWLB No. 517, 7 War Lab. Rep. II9 (1943), directing the
continuance of employment of one reinstated in accordance with an NLRB order.
181
Virginia Electric & Power Co., NWLB No. 41, 4 War Lab. Rep. 272 (1942),
directing that the company refrain from entering into a contract either with the AFL
union or the one found by the NLRB to be company-dominated and that it recognize
the AFL union for the adjustment of its members' grievances.
182
Virginia Electric & Power Co., I War Lab. Rep. 74 _(1942), where the
NWLB denied an AFL union's request for recognition as bargaining agent. See note
131 supra.
183
Western Cartridge Co., NWLB No. 491, 4 War Lab. ~ep. 427 (1942).
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a change of mind. It came to an agreementm with the National Labor
Relations Board that "in all cases of complaints about discharges the
War Labor Board ought not to act unless the number of nien discharged was so large a group that their remaining out would interfere ·
with the war effort." It also agreed "that the mere filing of the National Labor Relations Board Trial Examiner's report finding an unfair
labor practice ought not to afford .a ground for action by us since the
Trial Examiner's report may be reversed." Peculiarly enough this
agreement was not limited to cases of discharges allegedly in violation
of the National Labor Relations Act. At the NLRB's request, it applied to discharges not allegedly due to union activity but allegedly
arbitrary or without just cause. These discharges, of course, are not
subject to the jurisdiction of the NLRB.
..
The theory of the National Labor Relations Board, which vigorously sought the agreement, appears to be this: It is true that the National Labor Relations Act prescribes discharges for union acttivity and
not discharges for any other reason however unreasonable or.improper.
However, in deciding whether or not a discharge is for union activity,
the National Labor Relations Board and the courts have often given
consideration to the absence of a pr~per reason for discharg(:}, Accordingly, since both the National Labor Relations Board and the National
War Labor Board will inquire into the propriety of a discharge, the
National War Labor Board will be infringing upon the jurisdiction of
the National Labor Relations Board if it takes any cases of 'discharge.
The desire of the National Labor Relations Board to retain its
jurisdiction is very understandable. However, that must n~t blind ·us
to the fallacy in the above argument. That governme~t agency seems to
have overlooked the distinction between evidence and substan:tive rights.
It is true that absence of a proper reason may be evid~nti9,•!Y of di~
criminatory intention, if it is coupled with other matters such as union
activity and employer knowledge of it, etc. But that does not mean
that we are not discussing two very different things; one, a discharge
without justification, and the other, a discharge for union actjvity. The
National Labor Relations Board itself has argued for many years that
a discharge without cause is not the same as a discharge ·in• violation of
the National Labor Relations Act. Today apparently, it is adopting
the thinking of its anti-labor opponents in this, as in som_e ·other aspects.
In doing so, it is not merely being illogical, but it is injuring; the entire
scheme of Tabor relations for it is attempting to take away from the

.

iu Reported in dissenting opinion of Regional Board Eleven's Ind.ustry Members,
Centrifugal Fusing Co., NWLB No. 2480-D, 11 War Lab. Rep. 577 at 579 (1943).
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National War Labor Board a dispute over which the NLRB is neither
willing nor able to assume jurisdiction. Under the National Labor
Relations Board's contemplated scheme, an employee discharged without cause would have no recourse to an impartial tribunal for the settlement of his grievance. Fortunately, up to ~ow, the National War
Labor Board and its regional boards have taken jurisdiction over disputes involving discharges which could not possibly come within the
jurisdiction of the National Labor Relations Board. One such case
involved a discharge for alleged sabotage; 135 another because the employee was an alien whose loyalty was allegedly in question.136 It is to
be hoped that this general agreement will give way to the necessities of
industrial relations.
The tenor of the agency agreement suggests a narrow conception
of labor relations which is completely inconsistent with the previous
policies of the National War Labor Board. Possibly because of a fear
of infringing upon another agency's jurisdiction, the board. disregards
the fact that the discharge of a small number of men may .reasonably
lead to a strike by a large number, and that, even if no strike results,
the effect upon employee morale may be almost as disastrous. This
theory of NLRB "jurisdiction·" was carried to a bizarre extreme by one
of the regional board,s. In a recent case, it denied checkoff and a leave
of absence for union activity on the ground that "such issue is not
properly before the ... Board inasmuch as such issue requires determination by the National Labor Relations Board rather than the National
War Labor Board." 137
One may ask, as have industry NWLB members, why the board
should act at all. Our answer is that the- board must act in such a case
because a wrongful discharge gives rise to a bona fide grievance. Like
all other grievances, it must be settled by the government if the dis18s

Id. _

is.a Motor Wheel Corp., NWLB No. l 11-221-C, Region XI, IO War Lab. Rep.

714 (1943); see also Frank· Foundries Corp., NWLB No. 95, 3 War Lab. Rep. 223
(1942), where the board assumed jurisdiction over a dispute arising from the discharge
of ten employees and held that the union could file NLRB charges or submit the cases
to contract grievance and arbitration procedures.
Muskegon Piston Ring Co., NWLB No. 111-u97-HO, Region XI, IO War Lab.
Rep. 339 (1943), reinstating with back pay an employee discharged for alleged misconduct.
·
137 Arkansas Fuel Oil Co., NWLB No. 8-D-120, Region vm, 13 War Lab. Rep.
341 at 342 (1943). The NWLB has also granted certain relief usually foun_d in
NLRB orders. One such instance is the direction that the employer grant union representatives access to company property. General Petroleum and Richfield Oil Corps.,
NWLB No. II1-316-C, 12 War Lab. Rep. 7 (1943).
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putants themselves fail to settle the matter amicably.188 It is true that
_it has long been an employer's prerogative to determine C<!;USe for discharge. But that (like certain trade union "rights") is passing into
abeyance as collective bargaining contracts r>rovide for the -arbitration of
all disputes. It is only one of a large number of employer "rights"
which must be yielded today when the requirements of industrial peace
stand above all private considerations.
Our discussion of the agency agreement has been limited to its disposal of charges not based upon union activity. However, there is considerable strength to the more bitterly contested conclusion that the
'NWLB has the right to reinstate employees allegedly discharged for
union activity. In doing this, it is by no means conflicting with the
NLRB by engaging.in the cessation of unfair labor practices. Instead
it is engaging in work beyond the confines of NLRB juriscLiction: the
settlement of a labor dispute which might affect the prosecution of the
war. In wartime, restoration of the status quo ante is of preeminent
importance regardless of whether it takes the form of the cessation of a
strike, the restoration of seniority rights or the reinstatement of a discharged employee. The fact that the immediate effect of the NWLB's
directive order is similar to an NLRB reinstatement order cannot obscure the different legal character of the two governmental actions.
Conformance to the National Labor Relations Act may have a
more literal meaning, i.e., whether a board order is in violation of the
National Labor Relations Act. This question has been raised most
often by companies objecting to the board's maintenance of membership
clause. It was originally made in September 1941, at a time when the
National Defense Mediation Board had jurisdiction over lab0r di§,putes
affecting the war.189 Then, the general counsel of the National Labor
Relations Board stated that the proviso in section 8 (3) of the National
Relations Act "is not confined to the closed shop variety of contracts,"
but that it included "a maintenance of membership clause." 140
When the issue was raised before the National War Labor Board in
the Little Steel cases, the board pointed out that "Section 7 of the
Executive Order does not place a limitation upon the power of the
138 The War Labor Disputes Act, supra note l 1, imposes upon tl_i.e board the
duty to settle all labor disputes. See also Norge Machine Products Division of BorgWarner Corp., NWLB No. l II-5665-D, 14 War Lab. Rep. 367 (1944), where the
Eleventh Regional Board reinstated strikers "discharged" by the employer, reversed
on other grounds, 15 War Lab. Rep. 650 (1944).
189
Discussed in the opinion in the Little Steel cases, NWLB Nos. 30, 31, 34, 35,
1 War Lab. Rep. 324 (1942), mentioned supra note 15.
140 Id. at 355.
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Board finally to determine on their merits whatever issues may arise
in a labor dispute, but rather when read in conjunction with Section. 2
of the order, it places a procedural limitation upon the War Labor
Board in that the procedures of other existing agencies for the settlement of labor disputes shall be exhausted before the War Labor Board
takes jurisdiction." 141 •
However, the board has met flatly the substantive arguments relating to the National Labor Relations Act, conceding arguendo that
section 7 "relates to matters of substantive law rather than to procedural rights only." 142 It has repeatedly reaffirmed the conclusion originally reached by the National Defense Mediation Board and by the
general counsel of the National Labor Relations Board that its union
security provisions.are in strict conformance with the proviso to section
8 (3) of the Wagner Act.148
So-CALLED UNFAIR LABOR PRACTICES OUTSIDE THE SCOPE OF
NLRB AND SLRB JuRISDI_CTION
There are of course, many so-called unfair labor practices which
are outside the scope of the National Labor Relations Act and of the
various state labor relations laws. This is the result of the exclusion of
certain types of workers from the benefits of the National Labor Relations Act.1 44 It also results from the small number of state laws patterned after the National Labor Relations Act.145 That federal Jaw
excludes from the category of employer the United States, the states,
and their political divisions. 146 It excludes from its protection, workers
Id. at 354.
Ibid.
143 Id.; Mon.tgomery Ward & Co., Inc., NWLB No. 3930-D~ 10 War Lab. Rep.
415 (1943); Fairbanks, Morse & Co., NWLB No. 4327-D, 11 War Lab. Rep. 217
(1943); Vilter Mfg. Co., NWLB No. 3928-D, II War Lab. Rep. 332 (1943).
144
49 Stat. L. 449 (1935).
145
New York State Labor Relations Act, N.Y. Labor Law (McKinney, 1939)
art. 20, §§ 700-715, (Supp.' 1944). §§ 705, 707; Massachusetts State Labor Relations
Law, 1938 Acts, c. 345 as amended by 1939 Acts, c. 318 and 1941 Acts, c. 251, Mass.
Ann. Laws (Michie, 1942) c. 150A; Pennsylvania Labor Rela.tions Act, 1937 Acts,
No. 294, P. L. 1168 as amended, Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, §§ 211.1211.13, (Supp. 1943) §§ 211.3, 211.4, 211.7, 211.9; Minnesota Labor Relations
· Act, 1939 Laws, c. 440 as amended by 19_41 Laws, c. 469 and 1943 Laws, cs. 624
and 658, Minn. Stat. (Mason, 1927) (Supp: 1944) c. 23, §§ 4254-21 through 425447; Utah Labor Relations Act, 1937 Laws, c. 5'5, Utah Code Ann. (1943) §§ 49-1-8
through 49-1-2 5; Rhode Island State Labor Relations Act, 1941 Laws, c. 1066 as
amended by 1942 Laws, c. 1247; Wisconsin Employment Peace Act, 1939 Laws, c.
57, Wis. Stat. (1941) §§ 111.01-111.19; Kan. Laws, 1943, c. 191; Colo. Laws,
1943, c. 131.
146
·
49 Stat. L. 449 at§ 2(2) (1935).
141
142
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employed in agricultural work, in domestic service or by their parents
or spouses.147 It expressly excludes those workers who are subject to
the operation of.the Railway Labor Act,148 i.e., the more than a million
employees of railroads subject to the jurisdiction of the Interstate Commerce Commission. In addition, the recent NLRB policy -of refusing
to ascertain the collective bargaining representatives of foremen149 has
resulted in an important addition to this list of exceptions.
There are today only nine states which have state labor relations
laws of the administrative character of the Wagner Act.uo Consequently, most of the so-called intrastate employees are deprived of the
benefits of this type of protective labor legislation. In the few states
which do have such laws, certain employee categories are expressly
deprived of protection. The most prominent of these are those ex- .
eluded from the NLRA.151 Others are the employees of charitable,
educational and religious institutions.152 In addition, some states w:ill
not accept jurisdiction over representation disputes involving union
jurisdictional problems. 155
,
The absence of legislative provision has not prevented the occurrence of disputes involving intrastate employees. These disputes have
arisen by reason of discharge of employees, the existence of company
unionism, the refusal to bargain collectively, and other interference
with self-organization. The outl;>reak of war has not reduced the number of such disputes; and it has increased their seriousness. Those involving foremen from whom the NLRB has arbitrarily withdrawn the
147

Id. at § 2(3).
Id. at § 2(2).
149
Maryland Drydock Co., 49 NLRB, No. rn5, p. 733 (1943), 50 id. No. 53,
p. 363 (1943); see 23 id. No. 95, p. 917 (1940), 24 id. No. 83, p. 803 (1940).
For the history of unionization of foremen which casts substantial doubt upon the
propr.iety of the NLRB's order, see UNION MEMBERSHIP CoLLECTIVE BARGAINING B.;
FoREMEN, Bulletin N?; 745, U.S. Dept. of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics (1943),
and see also H. Hearings on H.R. 2239, H.R. 1742, H.R. 1728, H.R. 992, 78th
Cong., 1st sess., March-May 1943 (Committee on Military Affairs). These bills relate to the full utilization of manpower.
150
See note 145 supra.
151
See note 145 s_upra,. i.e., Colorado, Minnesota, New York, Pennsylvania,
Rhode Island, Utah, W1sconsm and Massachusetts, although the last cited state law
makes -no specific mention of the Railway Labor Act. Kansas defines neither employer n_or e1:1ployee. Colorado also excl~des executives and supervisory employees.
Both W1sconsm and Colorado exclude strikers and employees discharged on account
of union activities if they too were guilty of unfair labor practices.
152
N.Y. Labor Law {McKinney, 1939) art. 20, § 715; R.I. Acts, 1941, c.
rn66, § 16.
158
N.Y. Labor Law (McKinney, 1939) art. 20, § 705 (3); R.I. A1a:ts, 1941, c.
I066, § 6 (3).
148
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protection of the Wagner Act have led to very dangerous strikes. As a
result, the-National War Labor Board has been and will be repeatedly
asked to intervene in disputes of this nature involving employees who
have no recourse to federal or state agencies.154
Discharges

The most obvious type of dispute arises from the discharge of em. ployees who are represented by a labor organization. The discharge
may take two forms: First, where the employee claims to have been
discharged for union activity and second, where it is alleged that the
discharge is without just cause. If the first contention is made, and there
is a state or federal tribunal with the duty to protect the employee's
right to self-organization, the NWLB should not normally act except
as indicated above. However, assuming that the employee is engaged
in intrastate work in a state without a state labor relations law, it seems
clear that this type of dispute must be decided by. the NWLB.155 The
same is true of course of a discharge, regardless of the commerce aspect,
where the claim is made not that it was for union activity, but simply
that it was captious, otherwise improperly motivated or simply unreasonable.158 Here clearly for the reasons stated above the board must
necessarily act because there is no other tribunal with jurisdiction.
Con:pany Unions
One of the old-time methods of preventing labor organization has
been the creation of company unions, i.e., labor organizations dominated, formed or assisted by employers. Such unions have been of great
value to employers in interfering with the self-organization of their
employees. A large part of the litigation of the last eight years before
the National Labor Relations Board has involved this issue of com-

154 The NWLB has recently taken jurisdiction over a dispute affecting foremen,
exclusive of issues concerning bargaining rights and alleged discriminatory discharges
under the NLRA. It also ordered the reinstatement of the striking foremen. Aeronautical Products, Inc., 15 War Lab. Rep. 688 (1944).
155 Southern Service Ltd., NWLB -No. II l -3 58-C, Region x, • 8 War Lab. Rep.
442 (1943) where the reinstatement of discharged strikers was ordered.
158 Muskegon Piston Ring Co., NWLB No. lII-II97-HO, Region xr, IO War
Lab. Rep. 339 (1943) (unanimous order to reinstate with back pay an employee discharged for allegedly improper conduct). Motor Wheel Corp., NWLB No. lII-221C, Region xr, IO War Lab. Rep. 714 (1943), cited supra note 136 (order to reinstate
without back pay but with full seniority rights an employee discharged because he was
an alien under governmental investigation, who was subsequently "cleared"). Centrifugal Fusing Co., NWLB No. 2480-D, II War Lab. Rep. 577 (1943), cited supra
note 134 (discharge on account of alleged sabotage).
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pany unionism. The board, as well as Congress and the courts, has
made frequent findings that company-unionism interferes with" the
rights of collective bargaining and self-organization.157
It is, however, true that the issue of company unionism is not one
normally within the scope of the War Labor Board. While it can be
argued that employees have a fundamental right not to be discharged
without cause, it is somewhat more difficult to show that, in the absence
of statute, they have a fundamental right not to be subjected to the
burden of a company union. That "right" was first given to employees
generally through the passage of the National Labor Relations Act.m
It wduld seem proper, therefore, to require that any claims of company
unionism be dealt with only by national or state labor relations boards.
There is one exception to this conclusion. If the existence of a company
union imperils the collective bargaining rights of a labor organization
with a substantial representation among the employees involved, the
NWLB should disestablish the company union during the preelection
period.159
Refusal to Bargain Collectively
The United States Supreme Court has said that the right to argue
collectively through a union of one's own choosing, is a fundamental
one antedating the passage of the National Labor Relations Act.160
Whether or not one is wholly in agreement with this statement, it is
common knowledge that the refusal to deal with labor unions has historically been the prime cause of labor disputes.161 This type of dispute,
157
S. Rep. No. 573 on S. 1958, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. IO, May I, 1935; H.
Rep. No. I 147, 74th Cong., 1st sess., p. 18, June 10, 1935; Report of (old) NLRB
to President, for period July 9, 1934 to Jan. 9, 1935; National Labor Relations Board
v. Pacific Greyhound Lines, Inc., 303 U.S. 272, 58 S. Ct. 577 (1938); National
Labor Relations Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp., 301 U.S. 1, 57 S. Ct. 615
(1937).
158
See, however, the Railway Labor Act of 1934, 48 Stat. L. II85, 45 U.S.C.
(1940) §§ 151, 152; the Bankruptcy Act, 30 Stat. L. 544 (1898) as amended 19331934, II U.S.C. (1940) § 672; and the Emergency Railroad Transpoi,tation Act of
1933, 48 Stat. L. 211 at § 7E which protected special employee groups against the·
menace of company unions.
159
One suggested alternative is to grant a minority union exclusive bargaining
rights if "it can establish that the company has engaged in unfair labor practices in an
attempt to defeat the union or to prevent its becoming the recognized ·collective bargaining agent for the employees." Resolution of Twelfth Regional War Labor Board,
November 9, 1943 (unreported).
160
Amalgamated Utility Works v. Consolidated Edison Co., 309 U.S. 261, 60
S. Ct. 561 (1940).
161
See e.g., JOSEPH RosENFARB, THE NATIONAL LABOR PoucY AND How IT
WoRKs, c. 8 (1940).
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too, did not end with the outbreak of war, nor has it been limited to
those cases in which the NLRB or a similar state agency could direct
an employer to bargain collectively. It has occurred in many cases
where the employer is protected by reason of the intrastate character of
the business or because its employees come within one of the exceptions
to the application of the state law.
Disputes involving collective bargaining have arisen mainly in two
types of cases. One type is where the employer denies that the union
represents his employees,102 the other, ~here he admits it.168 Jn both
cases, it has been argued that he has no legal obligation to bargain and
that a directive order of the board, requiring such bargaining, establishes
a little Wagner Act for the state in which the employees work.164
The answer to this claim is, of course, somewhat different in wartime than in peacetime. Some of our states recognize the fundamental
right of self-organization and of collective bargaining in their constitutions or legislation.165 That they have not implemented this right with
legal machinery for its enforcement does not derogate from its existence. In peacetime, the absence of machinery for the enforcement of
this right is compensated by such economic weapon,s as the strike and
boycott. In wartime, these weapons must be put aside. As the Twelfth
Regional WLR recently stated:
·
"It does not follow, however, that employees have foregone
all opportunity .to gain by peaceful measures during time of war
that which may be available to them in time of peace.by use of force.
The War Labor Board was created so that both labor and management could settle such· issues peacefully for the duration of the
emergency without freezing either side to pre-war conditions." 166

Investigation of Representatives
The situation presents no distinction in principle where the employer denies that the union has been designated by its employees as
their exclusive collective bargaining agent: The board would merely
Southern Service Ltd., NWLB I II-3 58-C, Region x, 8 War Lab. Rep. 442
.
163 Champion Steam Laundry, NWLB No. III-312-C, Region v1, 9 War Lab.
Rep. 336 (1943); The Austin Co., NWLB No. 4264-D, 8 War Lab. Rep. 189
(1943) (sustaining prior order of RWLB VI); New Service Laundries, Inc., NWLB
No. III-1536-D, Region XII, IO War Lab. Rep. 626 (1943).
.
16.1 See particularly the dissenting opinion in New Service Laundries, Inc., NWLB
No. u1-1536-D, Region XII, 10 War Lab. Rep. 626 (1943).
165
E.g., Cal. Labor Code (Deering, 1943) § 923.
166 See New Service Laundries, Inc., NWLB No. III-1536-D, Region xn, IO
War Lab. Rep. 626 at 628 (1943), cited supra note 163.
162
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have to engage in the administrative process· of ascertaining the desires
of the employees. For this task it ~as the benefit of the precedents established by the National Labor Relations Board in eight rich years of
operation. Accordingly, since March of 1943, the national and regional
boards have made this type of investigation of representatives in the few
cases requiring this technique.167 In some cases, the board has employed
the old and now discarded card-check method of the NLRB.168 In
others, it has conducted elections by secret ballot.169 Following the practice of the National Labor Relations Board, it has made findings, first
as to the appropriateness of the bargaining unit and then as to the choice
of the employees. This practice had continued without interruption
until October 26, 1943 when the board issued its tentative opinion on
jurisdiction and on the certification of disputes. 110 It announced therein
that it would not enter the representation field "save under the most
compelling circumstances where the war effort clearly requires a particular course of action." 171 The board did not explain the nature br
extent of the compulsion which would lead to such action. Suffice it to
say that the cases in which this decision was reached involved the following:
1. Three laundry and dry cleaning establishments where according.
to the board "the record does not show that the dispute has become so
serious as to threaten substantial interference with war production." 112
2. The California Packing Corp. case, referred to above, involving
agricultural workers, in which the board found that "agriculture is
vitally necessary to the successful prosecution of the war." m
3. The Simon]. Murphy Co. 174 case where the board directed the
reinstatement of discharged employees because of "the potential effect
on the war" and "the risk fo the war effort that would be involved in
refusing to take jurisdiction of the dispute." If the last two examples
lack these "compel1ing circumstances". it is safe to assume that they do
not exist.
167

California Packing Corp., NWLB No. 111-549-D, WLB Press _Release B1066a, issued Oct. 31, 1943, I I War Lab. Rep. No. 8, XIV at xx in dissenting opinion,
cited supra note 76.
'
168
Information received from the board.
169
Union ..National Bank Building Operating Co., NWLB No. 4326-D, Region
vn, l l War Lab. Rep. 366 (1943); Colorado Springs Grocery & 'Meat Markets,
NWLB No. 111-887-D, 13 War Lab. Rep. 113 (1943).
170
Simon J. Murphy Co., NWLB No. 111-1228-D, California Packing Corp.,
NWLB No. l l 1-549-D, WLB Press Release B-1066, l 1 War Lab. Rep. No. 8, XIV,
mentioned supra note 76.
171
173
Id. at xvn.
Id. at xv11.
172
174
Id. at XVIII.
Id. at xix.
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Why did the board refuse to deal with this type of case? The tentative opinion stated that it involved a problem "with which this Board
is not equipped to deal." To that, a complete answer appears to have
been given in the dissenting opip.ion of the labor members. First, if
administrative changes are necessary, make them. ''We must adapt our
administrative machinery to the problem that must be solved. We
cannot shirk our responsibility by seeking to check the problem to fit the
machinery we have established at the present time." 175 Second, there
had been no material increase in administrative difficulties arising from
the handling of these representation cases during the period under discussion. Less than two per cent of the certifications of labor disputes to
the board from the time of the first representation case had involved
this problem.176
·
The second argument made by the board was that "such determinations are for the period preceding collective bargaining; the work of
this Board is, in the main, tied in with the period subsequent to negotiations, when collective bargaining has broken down." 177 The artificiality of this distinction will be obvious to every student of labor relations.
For many years representation disputes have been recognized as labor
. flisputes by courts and legislatures.178 It is rather late to write a new
q.efinition.
The third argument of the board is that "action by the War Labor
Board taken in the period when a union is unrecognized or uncertified
has not generally avoided recurring difficulties between the parties."179
This is a rather surprising statement since there had been an insignificant
number of elections conducted by regional boards 180 and there has been
no evidence of so-called "recurring difficulties."
·
The solution of the board-that the dispute be referred back to the
Conciliation Service,-is no solution at all if the board is not willing to
compel the settlement of representation cases. In its tentative opinion,
the board did indicate that it regarded management as obligated "to
accept a determination by democratic election of questions concerning
representation even though, in the particular situation, there may be no
statutory obligation to do so." 181 But this obligation is meaningless
176
Ibid.
Id. at xx.
Id. at xvn.
178 See Norris-LaGuardia Act, supra note 56, N.Y. Anti-Injunction Law, Civil
Practice Act, § 1876a.
179
Simon J. Murphy Co,, NWLB No. I II-I 228-D, California Packing Corp.,
NWLB No. I I 1-549-D, WLB Release B-1066, I I War Lab. Rep., No. 8, xrv at xvn,
cited supra note 76.
·
175
177

=Rd~
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unless the board is prepared to conduct elections in the face of management opposition. The board did say that the failure on the part of
management "to conform to these obligations will impose upon the
Board the necessity of specifying definite rules concerning certification
of cases, and the formulation of appropriate regulations in order that
collective bargaining may continue to perform its healthy fll;nction and
that the Board may continue to be an effective instrument for preserving
industrial peace." 182 But nowhere in the opinion does the board indicate that it will conduct such elections. Its contrary intentions may be
inferred from the vigorous dissenting opinion in which it was stated
that: "To expect exhortation and prayer to replace the threat of compulsion is to betray a naivete of which, we_ are certain, none of the
Board members is guilty." 188
The War Labor Board issued new and presumably final opinions
in these representation cases on February 4, r944.184 Whille these reaffirmed its original refusal to accept jurisdiction, the reasons offered
were somewhat different and the effect upon the original no-strike
agreement far less serious.
Agricultural workers were excluded because "the exclusion of agricultural labor from the provisions of the National Labor Relations Act
was based upon a deliberate policy judgment of Congress that the
Federal Go'vern~ent ought not to deal with questions of collective
organization and representation affecting such employees." 185 The
representation disputes of the building and laundry workers were rejected because "the Board would be assuming the virtual role of a
statutory labor relations board in states where local legislatures had not
seen fit to act." 186 These rejections appear to be absolute in character.
The board has finally eliminated the possibility suggested in the "tenta182

Ibid.
Id. a~ xx.
184
Simon J. Murphy Co., NWLB No. 111-1228-D, 14 War Lab. Rep. 7
(1944); California Packing Corp., NWLB No. u1-549-D, 14 id. 10 (1944), cited
supra notes 88, 99.
185 14 id. IO.
186
Atlanta & Savannah Laundries, NWLB Nos. III.-1840-D, 111-2638-D, 1112712-D, 14 War Lab. Rep. II (1944). Subsequently, the board adjudicated the Atlantic Laundry dispute in Atlantic Laundries, Inc., NWLB No. u1-5126-D, 17 War
Lab. Rep. 150 (1944); similar action was taken in Young Men's Ch:i;istian Assn.,
NWLB No. I11-1774-D, 15 War Lab. Rep. 236 (1944) and Universal Furniture
Mfg. Co., NWLB No. 111-3315-D, Region x, 15 War Lab. Rep. 619 (1944). But
see Polk Sanitary Milk Co., NWLB No. 1u-1826-D, Sixth Region, 15 War Lab.
Rep. 487, refusing jurisdiction over a dispute arising from an intra-state employer's
· refusal to bargain collectively.
188
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tive opinion" that it might enter the representation field "under the
most compelling circumstances where the war effort clearly requires a
particular course of action."
The board's reasons are persuasive in neither case. So far as agri- ·
cultural workers are concerned, the views of Congress with respect to a
peacetime statute like the National Labor Relations Act can have little
bearing upon the jurisdiction and powers of the wartime NWLB. The
board's statement that "the word employee as used in the War Labor
Disputes _Act is defined in Section 2 ( d) as having the same meaning
as in the National Labor Relations Act" 187,is equally irrelevant. Agricultural workers are employees, regardless of what definition was inadvertently written into this sprawling, badly-written Smith-Connally
Law. Certainly Executive Orders 9017 and 9250 are subject to no
such arbitrary limitations. It is doubtful whether Congress could have
curtailed by statute the board's power vested in it by the President,
even if this result were intended.
·
As for nonagricultural workers, the board's arguments are equally
weak. It may be true that a board conducting intrastate elections
"would be assuming the' virtual role of a statutory labor relations
board.m88 But this is a statement of fact rather than of legitimate
objection. If states have not acted to settle wartime labor disputes, the
board· must of necessity do so. The argument that "this is a role for
which the Board is not equipped" 189 repeats the one discussed and disposed of above.
·
What is there which makes the board's decision, if somewhat unreasonable, at least palatable? The answer lies in the board's decision
in the Anacortes Veneer Company 190 case rendered during the period
between the two sets of decisions herein discussed. There the board held
that a union representing a substantial minority of employees had a
right to litigate terms and conditions of employment of its own members. The rationale as stated in the opinion of Public Member Morse 191
was as follows:
"The National War Labor Board has concluded that, during
the existence of the present war emergency, in cases wherein no
187

California Packing Corp., NWLB No. I l 1-549-D, 14 War Lab. Rep. IO
944-), mentioned supra note 99.
'
188
Atlanta & Savannah Laundries, NWLB Nos. I 11-1840-D, I l 1-2638-D, I l 1. 2712-D, 14 War Lab. Rep. IO (1944), mentioned supra note 186.
189
Ibid.
190
NWLB No. 111-368-C, 13 War Lab. Rep. 150·(1943).
191
Id. at 152.
(l
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collective-bargaining agent has been certified for the employees
involved, any group of employees who have exhausted all the
normal procedures for obtaining wage inc,reases are entitled to
have their wage claims passed upon by the War Labor Board. If
the Board were to adopt the opposite point of view by ruling· that
wage demands could be presented only through the duly ¢ertified
or recognized collective-bargaining agent of the em})loyees in
question, it would be a party to a procedure which would effectively prevent small groups of employees, such as those involved
in the instant case, from securing deserved wage increases; The
National War Labor Board does not propose to become a party to
such a procedure."
Accordingly, in the second significant California Packing Corporation case opinion,102 the board deferred consideration of its jurisdiction
over nonrepresentation disputes that might arise between agricultural
laborers and their employers. And in the related laundry cases it said
that "where a dispute exists between an intrastate employer and his epiployees on questions other than the right of exclusive representation,
such as wages and conditions of employment, and the disput~ threatens
substantial interference with the war effort, the board has a-duty, under
the War Labor Disputes Act, to decide the dispute by prescribing appropriate terms and conditions of employment." 198
THE BASIC MAGNESIUM ,DOCTRINE

The passage of the Frey Amendment to the Labor-Federal Security
Appropriation Act 194 raised a particularly interesting legal problem. That amendment provided that the NLRB might not use the
funds provided by the bill to set aside a labor agreement, including orie
executed in violation of section 8 (3) of the National Labm; Relations
Act, unless its validity were attacked within three months after its
execution. The Basic Magnesium 195 case arose when that company
entered into a contract with an AFL union, following not~fication of a
CI O unioh's claims to representation. The latter then filed a petition
for certification and, after an employee election, was certified by the
National Labor Relations Board. When the company refused oo barI 944

192

California Packing Corp., NWLB No. III-549-D, 14 War Lab. Rep. IO
( 1944), also cited supra note 99.
198
Atlanta & Savannah Laundries, NWLB Nos. II 1-1840-D, I 11-2.638-D, I I 12712-D, 14 War Lab. Rep. II at 12. (1944), mentioned supra note 186.
m 57 Stat. L. 494 (1943).
195
Basic Magnesium Inc., NWLB No. 11-2980-D, 14 War Lab. Rep. 2.09
(1944).
'
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gain with the certified union, it filed unfair labor practice charges with
the NLRB. However, that agency refused to issue a complaint on the
ground that the rider precluded action in a complaint case arising over
an agreement entered into three months or more prior to the filing
of charges. This did not, however, still the dispute between the employer and the CIO union. The latter asked the NWLB to intervene
and order collective bargaining in line with the NLRB certification.
For, while the unlawful AFL contract was not subject to attack by the
NLRB, the NWLB was under no limitation, by appropriations rider or
otherwise, in the settlement of labor disputes. It could have directed
collective bargaining to which the CIO union was entitled under the
NLRB certification. Instead, it stated that "it declines to take jurisdiction." The board's press release states as a reason: "It was felt by the
majority that the War Labor Board could not properly undertake to
do what Congress had directed the National Labor Relations Board
not to do." 196 Recent hearings before the House Appropriations Committee illuminate the NWLB's error in failing to settle the dispute.197
GRIEVANCES

For many years, labor relations and personnel experts have recognized the necessity of procedures for the swift and fair settlement of
emplqyee grievances. The failure to emplc,y such procedures has· not
only caused obvious inequities, but has adversely affected employee
morale and work. As a result, progressive employers, including various
governmental departments and agencies, have set up grievance procedures even in the absence of a collective bargaining relationship with a
labor organization.198
The War Labor Board has been faced with two separate problems
in connection with grievance machinery: first, where only a minority of
the employees are organized, but request the adoption of a means of
settling grievances; second, where an employer, in the course of a dispute with the exclusive bargaining representative of its employees,
insists upon the establishment of a separate grievance machinery for
the non-union employees. These problems being distinct, they must be
considered separately.
The _National Labor Relations Act, as interpreted by the NLRB,
196

NWLB Press Release B-1316 (Feb. 20, 1944).
H. Hearings on the Department of Labor-Federal Security Agency Appropriation Bill for 1945, 78th Cong., 2d sess., March 14 through May 2, 1944 (Committee on Appropriations).
198 See e.g., Employee Grievance Procedure, approved for NWLB employees by
the Civil Service Commission, Personnel Branch, on Al!g. 24, 1943, (unreported).
197
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gives no collective bargaining rights to minority unions.199 The act is
predicated upon the theory of majority representation. Only a majority union whose representation has been proven by certification or
otherwise has the right to demand collective bargaining. If it does
not represent a majority of the employees, it may not demand lesser
rights such as, e.g., the establishment of a grievance procedure in a
contract or otherwise. These views of the NLRB are by Iio means
universally accepted by students of labor law. 200 A very strong argument can be made for the propositi9n that in the absence of an exclusive
bargaining representative designated by a majority of the employees in
the appropriate collective bargaining unit, minority groups have a right
to engage through their representatives in collective bargaining. The
basic section of the NLRA provides without limitation that "employees
shall have the right to self-organization . . . to bargain collectively
through representatives of their own choosing." 201 The next: section of
the act 202 makes it an unfair labor practice to refuse to bargain collectively with the representatives of employees. It would be in consonance
with the spirit of the statute to give literal application to those sections
by requiring collective bargaining with the representatives of organized minorities until the establishment, by designation of the majority,
of an exclusive bargaining agent. However, the NLRB, carrying the
theory of majority representation to an extreme length, has taken a
contrary position and this is unlikely to be modified or reversed by it
or the courts.208
This interpretation of the NLRA does not of course prevent the
NWLB from granting certain benefits to employees only a minority of
whom are organized in a union. The board, as appears below, has a far
broader standard of operation-the successful prosecution of the warthan the statutory unfair labor practices to which the NLRB is limited.
199

Huch Leather Co.,

11

NLRB, No. 37, p. 394 (1939); Todd Shipyards Corp.,

5 NLRB, p. 20 (1938).
200 See RosENFARB, THE NATIONAL LABOR PoucY AND How IT WoRKS 238 et
seq. (1940), mentioned supra note 161; a book review by Boudin, 55 HARv. L. REv.
555 (1942).
201
49 Stat. L. 449 at§ 7 (1935).
202 Id. at§ 8(5). The unfair labor practice is stated thus: "To refuse to bargain
collectively with representatives of his employees, subject to the provisions of section
9(a) ." The last named section merely provides that the representatives designated-by
the majority "shall be the exclusive representatives."
208
This view has been carried so far that the NWLB has refused to direct recognition for a minority union's own members, where another minority union had a contract to the same effect for its members. Pacific Mills Worsted Division, NWLB No.
III-705-D, II War Lab. Rep. 551 (1943), mentioned infra note 207.
·
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With this understanding, the NWLB discovered soon after the war
began that many pfants which had operated either without unions or
with company unions lacked an adequate method of settling the grievances of their employees. The board found that these grievances were
not receiving adequate attention and that in the word.s ·of one panel,
·"the resultant unrest may constitute a threat to maintenance of full
production." 204 Accordingly, beginning in April r 942, with the wellknown Sperry Gyroscope Company case205 the board ordered recognition of a minority union "as the repre~entative of its members on grievances" with the further provision that "all unsettled grievances shall
be submitted to arbitration for final and binding determination." The
Sperry case was one in which the company had previously been ordered
by the National Labor Relations Board to disestablish a company
union. 206 This has not, however, been regarded as a condition precedent
to the establishment of grievance procedures. The board' has ordered
the institution of this machinery in other types of cases. in one case,
where one of several organizing unions had petitioned the NLRB for
an election, the WLB directed the institution of this type of machinery
for the benefit of the several unions involved. 201• It,is probable that the
NWLB will act more conservatively in the future wherever the other
board is involved. It has agreed not to institute grievance machinery
without consultation with the NLRB, where another union's petition
for certification is pending, because of the possibility of interference
with the election. Likewise, where one union has been ordered disestablished by the National Labor Relations Board, the National War
Labor Board will only in an exceptional case grant another the benefits
of a grievance procedure because of the alleged possibility of damage
to the disestablished union-in the event that the disestablishment
204

Sperry Gyroscope Co., NWLB No. 70, l War Lab. Rep. 167 at 172 (1942).
Id.
206
Sperry Gyroscope Co., 36 NLRB, No. 264, p. 1349 (1941).
207
Acme Evans Milling Co., NWLB No. 584, 6 War Lab. Rep. 163 (1943).
See also Tennessee Schuylkill Corp., NWLB No. 585, 6 War Lab. Rep. 290 (1943)
where the sole union involved was granted limited recognition for the handling of
grievances for its own members pending NLRB action upon its petition for certification. See also Pacific Mills, Worsted Division, NWLB No. I I 1-705-D, I I War Lab.
Rep. 5 5 I ( I <)43), where the NWLB directed that one minority union use the
grievance machinery set up under the company's contract with another union. This
amended a directive of the First Regional Board creating a separate machinery. Pacific
Mills, Worsted Division, NWLB No. III-705-D, I I War Lab. Rep. 239 (1943).
However, the N_WLB has denied even the limited recognition for grievance purposes
to a union which lost an NLRB election. Harry Davies Moulding Co., NWLB No.
4305-D, II War Lab. Rep. 188 (1943). The unanimous decision here reversing the
hearing officer's report is very questionable.
20s
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order should be set aside by a circuit court of appeals.208 One may
very well question this hesitancy on the part of the NWLB since the
NLRB's decisions are usually enforced .in the courts, and in any event
a grievance procedure with a bona fide union is normally helpful to
everyone concerned, rather than injurious.
The second problem relating to the National Labor Relations Act
arises in the course of a dispute between an employer and a majority
union. Certain employers in the course of a labor dispute. have requested that the board grant individual employees the right to settle
grievances through a grievance procedure other than that• inserted in
the contract between the company and the majority union. Other employers have merely de~anded a contract clause reserving to individual
employees the right to present grievances directly to their employer.
The NWLB and its regional boards have usually refused to grant the
first clause on the ground that it is in violation of the NLRA, and the
second because it is an unnecessary and obviously provocative statement
of a statutory right. 209 A short reference to the provisions of the Wagner Act will explain these decisions. The law provides that: "Representatives designated or selected for the purposes of collective bargaining
by the majority of the employees in a unit appropriate for such purposes, shall be the exclusive representatives of all the employees in
such unit for the purposes of collective bargaining in respect to .rates
of pay, wages, hours of employment, and other conditions of employment." 210 It also contains a proviso that "any individual emplpyee or a
group of employees shall have the right at any time· to present grievances to their employer." 211 This has been interpreted by counsel for
208

Grievance machinery for two national unions had been ordered by the board
in Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., NWLB No. 427, 3 War Lab. Rep. 404 (1942),
after the NLRB had ordered the disestablishment of a union with which the company had a contract. Following an order of. the circuit court setting aside the NLRB
order, the NWJ:,B revoked its prior order. Sun Shipbuilding & Drydock Co., 7 War
Lab. Rep. 472 (1943).
209
Electric Boat Co., NWLB No. II 1-1238-D, Region n, 12 War Lab. Rep. 164
(1943); Foote Bros. Gear & Machine Corp., NWLB No. 2905-D, IO War Lab. Rep.
C)6 (1943); Bell Aircraft Corp., NWLB No. 111-131-C, 10 War Lab. Rep. 126
(1943); Borg-Warner Corp., NWLB No. '4246-D, IO War Lab. Rep. 63,1 (1943);
Lucas Machine Tool Co., NWLB No. II 1-204-R, 11 War Lab. Rep. 26 (1943);
Zion's Cooperative Mercantile Inst., NWLB No. I II-I IO-D, 13 War Lab. Rep. 6
(1943); Armour Fertilizer Works, NWLB No. III-879-D, 12 War Lab: Rep. 128
(1943); Aluminum Co. of America, NWLB No. III-18, 12 War Lab. Rep. 4.46
(1943).
210
49 Stat. L. 449 at§ 9(a) (1935).
211
Ibid.
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the National Labor Relations Board, as follows: 212 These individuals
or groups may "present" grievances to their employer by appearing on
behalf of themselves "at every stage of the grievance procedure set up
in the collective agreement ( regardless of whether it so specifies) but
leaving the exclusive representative entitled to be present and negotiate
at each such stage concerning its views as to the subject of the grievance."
The board's counsel concludes with these clarifying remarks: 213
"If at any level in the· established grievance procedure, there
is agreement between the employer, the exclusive representative,
and the individual or group, disposition of the grievance is thereby
achieved. Failing agreement of all three parties, any dissatisfied
party may carry the grievance through subsequent machinery until
the established grievance procedure is exhausted."
This excludes the possibility of a separate grievance procedure for the
unorganized or organized minority. As a WLB panel recently stated: m
" 'Presenting' a grievance means talking about it. 'Settling' a
grievance means doing something about it. Surely grievances of
a general nature, the settlement of which may affect other workers
or may serve as a precedent affecting others, should not be left to
the whim or weakness of the individual worker."
These practical views have the support of authority. In Atlantic
Coast Line R. Co. v. Pope.215 the Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, held that a non-union employee was subject to a grievance procedure established by a carrier and a union under the Railway Labor Act.
The court stated that "the duty of the minority to recognize the authority of representatives selected by the majority was as binding in
this respect as the duty of the carrier to treat with the representatives
so selected with respect to pay, rules, working conditions of employees,
etc." 210
.
A year later the Attorney General of the United States gave clear
expression 211 to the rationale of the decision, stating:
". . . Furthermore, it is as important that there be collective
212 Opinion of the general counsel (NLRB) interpreting the proviso to § 9(a).
of the National Labor Relations Act, 13 Lab. Rel. Rep. 142 at 143 (1943).
21s 1bid.
214 Electric Boat Co., NWLB No. u1-1238-D, Region n, 12 War Lab. Rep.
164 at 170 (1943).
215
(C.C.A. 4th, 1941) n9 F. (2d) 39.
216 Jd. at 43.
21
~ 40 Op. Atty. Gen., No. 59, pp. 4-5 (Dec. 29, 1942).
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action on the part of employees in the negotiation of settlements of
· grievances as it is that there be collective bargaining agreement
which relate to wages, hours, and other conditions of employment.
Disputes about grievancc:;s normally require interp~etatlons of
these latter provisions. Even where this is not the case, all members of the class or craft to which an aggrieved employee ~elongs
have a real and legitimate interest in the dispute. Each of them,
at some later time, may be involved in a simifar dispute." 218 '
While adopting these principles; the NWLB does not re~rd itself
as able to enforce them in all cases. Recently, it unanimously overruled
an order of its Eighth Regional Board which, at the request of a certified union, directed a company to cease meeting with a minority union
to settle grievances.219 The National Board took the position that exclusive jurisdiction rested with the NLRB. Since the regional board's
order was made as an incident to its determination of contract terms
between the employer and the certified union, we believe its decision
was proper and should not have been reversed.
COMPLIANCE AND SANCTIONS
The effective enforcement of its orders is one of the most trouble-some problems of the administrative agency. This is particttlarly true
of those agencies created by executive orders, as witness the recent difficulties of the President's Fair Employment Practice ColllJllittee.22.,
218

According to the attorney general, the individual employee's right to qpresent"
grievances was derived from § 2 (Fourth) of the Railway Labor Act, 44 Stat. L. 577
(1926) as amended by 48 Stat. L. u85 (1934), which states that "nothipg in this
act shall be construed to prohibit a carrier from permitting an employee, mdi'llidually,
or local representatives of employees from conferring with management during working_
hours without loss of time." (Italics ours). He also relied upon "the fµndamenta1
nature of the right involved" which justified its exercise until abrogation by unambiguous congressional action.
'
It should be emphasized that the individual employee engaging in the presentation of grievances may not substitute another union for the majority one. See, however, General Committee of Adjustment of the Brotherhood of Locomotive Engineers
v. Southern Pacific Co., (C.C.A. 9th, 1942) 132 F. (2d) 194 which came to the
rather peculiar conclusion that the Railway Labor Act conferred upon an individultl
employee the right to select even a minority union as his representative i~ grievance
proceedings in disregard of the existence of a majority organization. The clecision was
set aside on other grounds by the United States Supreme Court, 320 U.S. 338, 64 S.
Ct. 142 (1943).
219
Hughes Tool Co., NWLB No. u1-2083-D, 14 War Lab. Rep. 81 (1944)
affirming and amending NWLB No. vm, D-78, Region vm, l l War Lab. Rep. 477
(1943).
220
On the FEPC and the railroads, see N. Y. TIMES, p. l (Dec. 27, 1943); id.
at p. l (Dec. 14, 1943); PM (Oct. 30, 1943). See also H. R. Hearings before the
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It is true, too, to a lesser extent of those agencies created by statute.
Thus, for example, enforcement of the National Labor Relations Act
has been frequently obstructed because of the mild character of its
sanctions.221 Compliance with a purely remedial statute is rarely
achieved without considerable difficulty.
The situation with respect to the War Labor Board is extremely
complex. The board began its existence as the creation of an executive
order but it has been given certain powers under two statutes. The Act
of October 2, I 942, does make substantial provision for its enforcement. Thus it states that:_ 222
"No employer shall pay, and no employee shall receive, wages
or salaries in contravention of the regulations promulgated by the
President under this Act. The President shall also prescribe the
extent to which any wage or salary payment made in contravention of such regulations shall be disregarded by the executive departments and other governmental agencies in determining the
costs and expenses of any employer for the purposes of any other
law or regulation."
The act also provides that:
"Any individual, corporation, partnership, or associat).on willfully violating any provision of this Act, or of any regulation
promulgated thereunder, shall, upon conviction thereof, be subject
_to a fine of no more than $ I ,ooo, or to imprisonment for not more
than one year, or to both such fine and imprisonment." 223
E.xecutive Order 92 50 contains provisions substan't:ially similar,
delegating to the board the authority to determine that a payment is in
contravention of the act, or any rulings, orders or regulations promulgated thereunder. 224
However, these provisions relate only to the wage stabilization pro. gram and to wage regulations of the board made pursuant to the Act
of October 2, r942, and Executive Order 9250. They do not fortify the
board's powers and decisions in dispute cases.
Special Committee to Investigate Executive Agencies, Part 2, June 30, 1943 through
· March I 6, 1944.
·
221
Boudin, "How to Amend the Wagner Act," 100-NEw REP. 7 (1939), mentioned supra note 117.
222
56 Stat. L. 765 at § 5(a) (1942).
22
31d. at § II.
.
224
7 FED. REG. 7871 (Oct. 1942); 4 War Lab. Rep. viii (Oct. 3, 1942). Title
III, § 2 of the order is the authority for the statement. See also Regulations of the
Economic Stabilization Director, § 4001.15, C.C.H. IA LABOR LAW SERVICE, p.
10,410, ,r 10,417.
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There, the situation is very different. The board is essentially an
advisory tribunal, representative of the public, industry and labor. Despite the fact that it speaks with the voice of authority in the form of
directive orders, it is still nothing more than an advisory tribunal .
recommending the disposition of disputes to the parties and, where
necessary, to .the President or to the Director of Economic Stabilization.225 Until recently, the board lacked even the power to compel the
attendance of parties, to subpoena witnesses or to punish for contumacious behavior at formal hearings. Today, under the War Labor
Disputes Act, it has been given· subpoena power, the enforoement of
which is in the hands of the federal district courts.226 While it has also
been given the power "to decide the dispute," 221 the sta,tute·fails to
provide any new mechanism for the enforcement of any such. decision.
The statute does, of course, provide for the seizure by the President of
plants, mines, or other facilities, where there is a threat to war production. Presumably this threat exists in every case in which directive
order is disobeyed. However, the power to seize a war plant existed
prior to the statute and was exercised by the President pursuant to his
constitutional war powers.
Additional sanctions for the purpose of effectuating compliance with
the directive orders of the board are now set forth in Executive Order
9370 issued by the President on August 16, 1943.228 These sanctions
may only be applied to enforce those orders of the board issued under
the War Labor Disputes Act. It has taken the position that 9rders issued ·before the ~ffective date of the act, i.e., June 25, 1943, ai:e not enforceable under this extcutive 0rder.229
This limitation seems entirely unreasonable. Most of the remedies
provided in Executive Order 9370 are less drastic than that of the
seizure of a war plant. It could not have been the intention of the
President to limit the enforcement of orders issued prior to June 25 ·

a,

iu See Exec. Order 9370, IO War Ltb. Rep. VII (1943).
Since the foregoing was written the board's claim that it is merely an advisory
tribunal has been judicially upheld. In re Employers' Group of Motor Freig;h.t Carriers
T. National War Labor Board, No. 8680, U.S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia,
June 2, 1944, 16 War Ltb. Rep. 147; In re'Montgomery Ward & Co. v. National
War Labor Board, No 8732, U. S. Court of Appeals, District of Columbia, July 19,
1941, 17 War Lab. Rep. 345.
·
m War Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. L. 163 at § 7 (1943).
227
_
Id. at § 7(a)(2).
us IO War Lab. Rep. VII (1943), mentioned supra note 225.
229
United States Gypsum Co. v. National War Ltbor Board (D. Ct. D. C. Civil
No. 21363), Memorandum of pepartment of Justice, Affidavit of Lloyd K. Garrison,
Executive Director of National War Labor Board (unreported).
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to this one measure of taking possession of a plant or factory while remaining free to use less severe methods of enforcing later orders.
The executive order authorizes the Director of E~onomic Stabilization to issue these directive orders in non-compliance cases to government departments or agencies: (a) to withhold from a non-complying
employer "any priorities, benefits or privileges extended, or contracts
entered into, by executive action of the government" (b) in the case
of a plant seized under the War Labor Disputes Act, to withhold from
a non-complying labor union the checkoff and 0th.er benefits accruing
to it at the time of seizure; (c) "in the case of non-complying individuals, directing the entry [by the War Manpower Commission] of appropriate orders relating to the modification or cancellation of draft
deferments or employment privileges, or both."
Reliance upon these sanctions will, in all likelihood, be infrequent.
The prestige of the board, enhanced by its tripartite character, together
with the public notoriety given to offenders, has proven very effective
in the past. Of the more than a thousand labor disputes decided by the
board in the first year and a half of its existence, only seven had to be
referred to the President for what he termed, "persistent non-compliance." 280 However, as the war takes on a more satisfactory aspect, as
the board's operations become more technical and its wage stabilization
program more rigid and as strikes receive impetus through the War
Labor Disputes Act,281 the need for sanctions other than those upon
which the board has hitherto replied, is obvious. Executive Order 9370
was born of this need.
· The executive order does not, of course, take care of every possible
situation. For practical reasons, small employers, particularly those in
non-defense work, may rei;nain untouched by the sanctions provided for
in the executive order. It is very unlikely that the President would
seize a business not falling under the definition of a war facility set
forth in section 3 of the War Labor Disputes Act. 232 While in some
cases, the less drastic sanctions referred to by the President in a letter
accompanying his executive order, i.e., "including control of war contracts, of essential materials, and transportation and fuel". 233 can be
applied, board members have questioned their applicability to small
280

Exec. Order 9370, IO War Lab. Rep. VII at vm, mentioned supra note 225.
The act, by providing a procedure for strike notices, proved in practice, as
the President had warned in his veto message, to be an incitement to strike; hundreds
of strike notices were thereafter filed.
282
57 Stat. L. 163 (1943), mentioned supra note I I .
233
IO War Lab. Rep. VII.
231
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non-de(ense industries. The situation will be particularly acute in the
case of hospitals and other non-profit and charitable agern::ies which
have hitherto resisted the jurisdiction of the board. It is inoonceivable
that the "iess drastic sanctions" referred to by the President could be
applied to this type of enterprise. What is not unlikely, however, is
its seizure by the President as Commander-in-Chief of the armed
forces rather than pursuant to his authority under the War Labor Disputes Act. The fact that these enterprises are not war faciliti~ does not
render unimportant the economic disturbances and the e:ffect ~pon community morale arising from their disregard of board decision$ in dispute
cases. While some such enterprises are permitted certain procedural
privileges with respect to voluntary wage adjustments,284 they are
nevertheless subject to· national wage policies and susceptible to civil
and criminal penalties for violation of those policies. There is no reason why greater latitude should be shown them in dispute cases where
the violation:s, if they occur, are far more likely to be wilful. The argument has occasionally been made that it is impractical to seize control
of a charitable or non-profit institution. 235 These difficulties are highly
exaggerated. Our governments, state and federal, have had! more experience in the non-profit, philanthropic'and charitable than in the business fields. If they can move into the latter, under the spur of a national emergency, they can do the same for the former.
·
It is, of course, to be hoped that the prestige and authority of the
board, particularly as supplemented by Executive Order 9.3 70, will secure by their mere existence complia1;1ce with directive orq:ers of the
National War Labor Board. The possibility that sanctions-may occa~
sionally have to be used should, howe_ver, not be forgotten.
SUPERSEDURE

.

One final constitutional concept relating both to jurisdiction and enforcement, may be noted here: that of supersedure. In view of the fact
that the board's powers are predicated upon the wide base of constitutional war powers and that the War Labor Disputes Act gives it absolute power to determine labor disputes and to "provide by order the
ZS 4 E.g., see Board Resolution of Oct. 16, 1943, reported at II War Lab. Rep.XLI ·
(Oct. 20, 1943) on non-profit agencies; see also board order on non-prbfit ·hospitals
issued Jan. 25, 1943, 6 War Lab. Rep. vm; and order on three non-profit agencies
conducted for the benefit of the blind, WLB Press Release B-477, issuea March II~
1943, 7 War Lab. Rep. xxv.
235
Transcript of Public Hearing, Security Title and Guarantee Co., Dec; 3, 1943,
Case No. 646, and particularly Public Member Wayne Morse's remarks at p. 25 et seq.
(unreported).
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wages and hours and all other terms and conditions ( customarily included in collective bargaining agreements) governing the relations
between the parties," 286 it is natural that problems of conflict with state
power should arise.. _
Every such problem of conflict must be met in the same manner:
The familiar principles of supersedure are applicable. Where the federal government steps in, the power· of the states is ousted.287 This is
not to m.ean that the mere existence of Executive Orders 9017 and
9250 and the War Labor Disputes Act nullifies this state legislation.238
The emergency character of the board and the procedural conditions
precedent to its action preclude any claim of congressional intention to
automatically supersede all state labor, legislation. But when the board
~foes act, it is not bound by and may disregard existing state or municipal
law or regulations.
Thus, in the Greenebaum Tanning Company case,289 ·the board was
faced with the employer's contention that the Wisconsin Employment
Peace Act 240 prevented it from directing the parties to a labor dispute
to adopt the standard maintenance of membership clause. The board
answered this contention in two ways: first, it declared that the Wisconsin statute which required a three-quarters vote'of the e,nployees before
the employer could execute an all-union shop agreement was unlawful
because it was in violation of the National Labor Relations Act; second,
it held that quite aside from this conflict with a federal statute, the state
law was superseded by the powers of the War Labor Board under the
above mentioned executive orders and statute. Said the board: 241
"The war powers of the President and Congress, under which
the Board derives its authority to order the Greenebaum Company
and its employees tQ abide by the maintenance-of-membership
clause of the Board's directive order, are superior to and supplant
any legislation of the State of Wisconsin which would place restrictions or conditions upon the maintenance-of-membership provision which the Board has seen fit to apply. The Board has
arrived at this conclusion upon the premise that the absolute neces57 Stat. L. 163 at § 7(a) (2) (1943).
za 7 Napier v. Atlantic Coast Line Ry. Co., 272 U.S. 605, 47 S. Ct. 207 (1926).
288
Cf. Mintz v. Baldwin, 289 U.S. 346, 53 S. Ct. 6u (1933); see also Allen
Bradley, Local No. II II v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 3 l 5 U.S. 740,
62 S. Ct. 820 (1942).
•
289
NWLB No. 879, 10 War Lab. Rep. 527 (1943).
240
'
Wis. Stat. (1941) §§ III.0I-III.19.
241
Greenebaum Tanning Co., NWLB No. 879, IO War Lab. Rep. 527 at 539
(1943), mentioned supra note 239.
·
286
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sity for peaceful and prompt settlement of wartime labor dispute
calls for full use of those broad and extensive powers of the
President and Congress heretofore designated as the war powers.
"No law of a state which is aimed at inserting conditions in a
collective bargaining contract between an employer and the bargaining agent of the employee:, can be said to ~upersede any order
of the War Labor Board regulating relations between employer
and employee in time of war when the poy;er to issue that regulatlon :flows from the war powers of the United States. There can
be no 'concurrent jurisdiction' between state _legislation and War
Labor Board rulings concerning ·employer-employee relations
when their provisions conflict. The War Labor Board~s rulings in
the instant case are proper under the W3:.r Labor Disputes-Act and
under the terms of Executive Order 9017; therefore, they must
prevail. Any other interpretation could unduly limit the ·war powers of the United States and would seriously interfere with the
successful prosecution of the war."
Of course, similar state laws in Colorado and Kansas can prove no
greater obstacles to the granting of union security in those sta.tes.2 ~2 The
same principles must render ineffective those laws of Coforado and
Pennsylvania which place limitations upon the deduction. of dues
through check-off. In the one state these dues deductisms are made
unlawful in the absence of an individual authorization terminable upon
thirty days notice; 243 in the other, in the absence of an individual authorization and a majority vote of the employees in the unit.24~ Checkoff has often been granted by the board for the purpose of rendering
convenient the collection of dues. In some cases, the aim primarily has
been to facilitate the union's efforts to collect the dues; in others, to
insure against any interference with production. In addition, the board
has granted a check-off of dues as a form of union security, often in
conjunction with the maintenance of membership provisfons. In any
of these cases, the direction that parties adopt a compulsory check-off
must supersede any inconsistent state regulations. The ~a.rd and its
regional agencies have accordingly granted check-off in disputes involving employees in these states.245 However, one line of deci:sions, that
issued by the Eleventh Regional Board in Detroit, came to an obviously
242

Colo. Laws, 1943, c. 131 at§ 6(1)(c); Kan. Laws, 1943, ~- l<JI at§ 8(4).
Colo. Laws, 1943, c. 131 at§ 6(1)(i).
·
'
244
Pa. Stat. Ann. (Purdon, 1941) tit. 43, § 211.6(1)(£).
245
United States Vanadium Co., NWLB No. 111-1021-D, 13 War Lab. Rep.
5 2 7 ( I 944), mentioned infra .note 249.
248
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erroneous conclusion.246 That local board denied a compulsory checkoff on the ground that Michigan law 247 made it a criminal offense for
an employer to "require any employee . . . [to] agree to contribute ...
, to any fund for charitable, social or beneficial . . . purposes." This
Michigan law could not have been intended to apply to the check-off
of union dues. The National Board his in several cases given a properly limited application to other state laws which were claimed by
employers to constitute a bar to the board's compulsory check-off
orders.248
•
Very recently in the United States Vanadium Company case,249 the
board decided not to rely upon this proper method of by-passing a
state law. It flatly met the issue of conflict. In one of Dean Morse's
last opinions before his regrettable resignation, it granted the standard
maintenance of membership and the irrevocable check-off in the face
of the prohibitions of the Colorado Peace Act. Said Dean Morse: 250
" . . . The efforts of the United States in the present world
conflict are being conducted by the nation as a unit not by the several states as separate entities. It is therefore reasonable to insist
that the settlement of wartime labor disputes be carried on under
the uniform procedures established by the_United States Government as a central authority."
CONCLUSION

The work of the board has not ended. The board may be expected
to continue in existence through the reconstruction period after the
war unless the rigidity of its wage stabilization program results in its
premature destruction. Some observers believe that the value of the
board is so substantial that we must establish some such institution on
a permanent basis after the war. Notwithstanding the uncertainty of
the board's future, its rich past suggests these comments:
The magnitude of the board's task has been unprecedented in the
field of labor relations. A parallel elsewhere is found only in the work
of the Office of Price Administration. The National War Labor Board
246 Universal Products Co., NWLB No. 111-3236-D, Region XI, 12 War Lab.
Rep. 297 (1943).
247
Mich. Stat. Ann. (1937) § 28.585.
, 248 Washburn Wire Co., NWLB No. 111-298-C, 12 War Lab. Rep. 124 (1943).
See also Denver Fire Clay Co., NWLB No. l l 1-2000-D, Region IX, IO War Lab. Rep.
585 (1943), holding that check-off is not inconsistent with Colorado assignment of
wage law.
·
249
NWLB No. 1u-1021-D, 13 War Lab. Rep. 527 (1944).
250 Id~ at 535.

WAR LABOR BOARD

has borne the double burden of wage stabilization and of settling labor
disputes. Its predecessor in the first World War, of course, was not
concerned with wage stabilization and hence had fewer and less serious
problems. But even in the field of labor disputes, the two boards show
little similarity. Those disputes involving wages must be determined
today on the basis of involved economic criteria w.fiich troubled no one
in 1918. The present board's jurisdiction over labor disputes generally
is much greater than its predecessor's because of the comprehensive
nature of a total war and today's war economy. The number of disputes
handled, even in the industries over which the first War Labor Board
took jurisdiction, are infinitely greater. This is the result of the differences in the country's war ·produc-tion between 1918 and 1941-44, the
longer period of the second board's operations· and the fact: that the
higher extent of union organization has made working conditions dependent in larger part upon bilateral rather than unilateral action.
The most vigorous critics of the board_ must pause in admiration
for its aecomplishments. Let us pass over its wage stabilizatiQn policies,
its recent attempts to limit its own jurisdiction, and the adm;inistrative
inadequacies which have led to· intolerable delays in the rendition of
decisions. Some of these matters are not germane to this discµssion and
will be dealt with elsewhere; others have been sufficiently discussed
above. In neither case can they detract from the board's magnificent
work.
These are the accomplishments of the present board: This is the
first time that the tripartite method of handling labor disputes has been
successfully attempted on a national scale. Our experiences in the first
World War are not comparable for many reasons, including those suggested above. The board, through the tripartite appointment of panels,
and the similar composition of itself and its subordinate agencies has
actually engaged in a modified form of national and industry-wide
collective bargaining approaching forms hitherto found only in Sweden
and England. The reasonableness of this type of bargaining is so
generally recognized that we may expect a continuance of it in. many
industries even if we fail to set up for the postwar period an agency
similar to the present National War Labor Board. The extraordinary
degree of voluntary compliance with the poard's decisions bea:rs testament to the soundness of its tripartite character, to the reas@nableness
of its decisions and to the fairness and patriotism of industry and labor.
Finally, the board has assisted this by cracking down without hesitancy
upon employer or union violation of its decisions or of the no-strike-no-lockout" agreement, and by expeditiously certifying such violations
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to the President. This success must be regarded in the ligltt of the
fact that the board was without statutory support until a year and a
half after starting operations, that it possessed no sanctions of its ~wn,
and that its· decisions, though phrased in the form of directive orders,
were merely recommendations. It is very doubtful whether any other
agency, resting upon so perilous a foundation, entrusted with jurisdiction over so delicate a subject matter, itself possessing only moral sanctions, has ever in the history of this country had so successful and
productive an existence.

